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Dear reader:
Is the American Dream slipping away? One in 33 current U.S. homeowners may be headed toward foreclosure in the coming
years because of subprime loans, according to our new report, Defaulting on the Dream. In some states, the crisis is particularly
acute—in Arizona, for instance, one in every 18 homeowners could lose their home; in Nevada, the ratio is one in 11. 
The problem hardly stops there. Because of foreclosures in their communities, an additional 40 million homeowners may see
their property values and their municipalities’ tax bases drop by as much as $356 billion in the next two years. Nearly every
state is affected: in 47 states and Washington, D.C. the number of mortgage loans entering foreclosure as of December
2007 had increased by at least 20 percent since December 2006. Ten states alone could lose a total of $6.6 billion in tax
revenue in 2008, according to a recent analysis by the firm Global Insight.
The stakes are incredibly high. Homeownership is the primary vehicle through which American families build financial
security. It also is an essential building block of state and local economies.
Defaulting on the Dream: States Respond to America’s Foreclosure Crisis is the first-ever comprehensive look at what states
have been doing to tackle this critical issue. It showcases approaches in two principal areas: (1) helping borrowers avoid
foreclosure and keep their homes; and (2) preventing problematic loans from being made in the first place. This report
recognizes that while some states moved quickly to respond, their approaches are not yet proven.
At this writing, federal lawmakers are deliberating important proposals to try to address the crisis. Among other measures,
Congress is considering federal funds to expand counseling programs for homeowners at risk of foreclosure, tax-exempt
bonds for localities to refinance subprime loans and a hefty increase in federally insured mortgages. It also is debating the
need to strengthen underwriting standards.  
While policy makers and the media have focused on the immediate foreclosure crisis, Pew, together with our partners,
continues to call for more action to strengthen standards to prevent more troubling loans from being made in the future.
While the causes of the current crisis are multifaceted, had these basic consumer protection safeguards been in place, we
may have curtailed this current calamity. The need is particularly acute as Congress considers ways to rewrite loans for those
borrowers currently facing foreclosure. In this arena, many states have taken the lead, requiring lenders to verify a borrower’s
income and ability to repay at the fully indexed interest rate and not just at the low initial “teaser” rate, requiring the escrow
of taxes and insurance payments and documenting the value of the property being financed.  
Most experts agree this is a national crisis that warrants a national response, with the federal government providing both
leadership and funding. But Congress should take into account what some states already have put in motion to try to stem
the foreclosure tide and prevent the crisis from happening again. In the absence of federal leadership, states have been
experimenting with homeowner counseling, refinance programs, stronger regulation of lending practices and other actions.
As it deliberates, Congress should be aware of how its decisions will impact states’ efforts already underway—building on,
rather than pre-empting, the strongest state statutes, and ensuring that states retain the flexibility to respond to local
conditions and needs. 
Defaulting on the Dream was researched and written by The Pew Charitable Trusts’ Center on the States (PCS), in
collaboration with Pew’s Health and Human Services (HHS) program. PCS identifies and encourages effective policy
approaches to critical issues facing states. HHS’ Family Financial Security portfolio seeks to advance common-sense
solutions to help Americans save for tomorrow and manage debt today. The Center for Responsible Lending, one of the
portfolio’s partners and a key source of data and analysis for this publication, focuses on expanding homeownership by
curbing abusive lending practices.  
We hope this report informs Congress’ important deliberations and helps ensure that federal and state policy makers work
closely together to address America’s foreclosure crisis. 
Sincerely,
Sue Urahn Shelley Hearne
Managing Director Managing Director
Pew Center on the States Health and Human Services
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Overview
Few imaginable economic events send the same
message of fear and foreboding in America as a
housing crisis. For most Americans, their homes are
their greatest asset. And for the states, industries
dependent on housing are cornerstones for economic
growth and fiscal stability.
Almost every state in the country has seen a significant
increase in mortgage foreclosures, largely triggered by
defaults on subprime mortgages. Yet greater
challenges lay ahead. Based on new foreclosure
projections by the Center for Responsible Lending, Pew
estimates that one in 33 current U.S. homeowners will
be in foreclosure, primarily in the next two years—the
direct result of subprime loans made in 2005 and 2006.
Among the states hardest hit are Nevada, where one in
11 homeowners could soon be in foreclosure;
California, with one in 20; Florida, with one in 26, and
Georgia, with one in 27. 
In other states where the numbers are less severe, the
situation is still troubling. If the economy tightens and
home prices continue to fall, as many economists
believe will be the case, more states and their residents
will feel increasingly acute pain. The nation’s foreclosure
crisis does not discriminate by region or size. In states
such as Colorado, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Ohio,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee and Texas, at least 
one in 37 homeowners is projected to experience
foreclosure as a result of a subprime loan. 
Nationally, about 3.3 million home mortgages may
default in 2007 and 2008, and more than two million
homeowners could lose their homes, according to Mark
Zandi, Moody’s Economy.com’s chief economist, who
testified before the U.S. House Housing Financial
Services Committee in February 2008.1
The effects reach far beyond a single house on a single
block. Homeowners are estimated to lose $356 billion
in home value because of nearby foreclosures, affecting
nearly 40 million homes. The foreclosure problem also
has spread to homeowners with prime loans—
borrowers with solid credit histories. With home prices 
falling and credit tightening, prime borrowers are facing
the same financial stress as those with subprime credit. 
While this is a national crisis, states and local
municipalities arguably will be asked to carry a larger
share of the foreclosure burden as tax revenues decline
and they experience increased demands for police and
other services to deal with vacant and abandoned
properties. 
A growing number of states have taken action, seeking
at least to mitigate the damage to homeowners,
lenders, municipalities and their own budgets. The
severity and speed of the crisis have meant that, in
many cases, states are experimenting with innovative
but as yet unproven approaches. The jury is still out
about whether and to what extent they will be
effective. Still, several states among those hardest hit
by foreclosures also have been among the most
assertive in trying to address the problem. 
These states are using a range of approaches to help
residents at imminent risk of foreclosure from losing
their homes. They are beefing up lending enforcement
to prevent problematic loans from being made in the
first place. And recognizing that the crisis demands a
collaborative approach, they are bringing together all
the major stakeholders, including lenders and
representatives of the financial services market, to try to
tackle the challenges comprehensively.
Ohio, for instance, launched a statewide campaign,
including a 24-hour hotline, to encourage borrowers at
risk of foreclosure to seek counseling. Ohio also sought
involvement across the state to improve assistance for
borrowers facing foreclosure, calling on lenders in the
state to modify high-cost loans for homeowners. In
early April, Governor Ted Strickland reached agreement
with nine mortgage servicers on a significant effort to
modify the terms of adjustable-rate subprime
mortgages in Ohio. These and other actions sprang
from a task force, created in March 2007 by the
governor, that convened representatives from industry,
government and the nonprofit sector to collaborate on
policy recommendations. 
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Michigan now has two loan funds that help
homeowners facing foreclosure, a statewide consumer
education campaign and a task force; the state also
requires greater disclosure of terms and conditions
before a high-risk loan is made. California, which
launched a task force last year, regulates mortgage
brokers and high-risk loans and has issued a notice to
loan servicers calling on them to agree to wholesale
loan adjustments. 
Although they had fewer loans in the foreclosure process
as of December 2007, states such as Maryland and
Massachusetts are taking similar steps, recognizing that
they will face bigger problems if they do not act.
Maryland recently passed sweeping emergency reforms,
providing immediate help to distressed homeowners
while strengthening the state’s oversight of the mortgage
industry. It extended the foreclosure process from 15 to
150 days, criminalized mortgage fraud, banned
prepayment penalties and is seeking to prevent
deceptive foreclosure rescue transactions. Massachusetts
soon will provide borrowers in default on their mortgage
payments 90 days to work with their mortgage servicers
to try to avoid foreclosure. In addition, the state recently
made $2 million in grants available for foreclosure
education, prevention and counseling initiatives.
Some states are contemplating more aggressive actions
to delay foreclosure and its ripple effects on
neighboring homes. In New York, legislators proposed
a moratorium on foreclosures for one full year.
Massachusetts, Minnesota and New Jersey have
proposed six-month deferments of foreclosures, with
Minnesota and New Jersey’s proposals including some
form of rent-back or partial payment from the
delinquent borrower. These proposals to place long-
term moratoria on foreclosures face steep industry
opposition, but they highlight the pressure states are
under to try to address the current crisis.
But given the scale of the crisis and the complexity of
today’s mortgage markets, states cannot go it alone,
and it makes little sense to have 50 separate and
specific responses. There is broad agreement that the 
federal government should take a strong leadership
role. As it considers a range of proposals, both to help
more homeowners stave off foreclosure and to
strengthen underwriting standards, Congress should
understand what states already are doing and how its
policy choices will affect those efforts. It also should
ensure that states have flexibility to pursue measures
that respond to their particular circumstances and needs
and build on, rather than pre-empt, those actions that
go the furthest in protecting homeowners from practices
that undermine wise and responsible borrowing choices. 
We have based our findings in this report on data and
analysis that are comparable to information from well-
respected industry analysts such as First American,
Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse and
Moody’s Economy.com. We rely on the Mortgage
Bankers Association’s National Delinquency Survey to
highlight foreclosure challenges at the end of
December 2007. In addition, we use the Center for
Responsible Lending’s projections to draw attention to
the estimated number of foreclosures and ripple effects
from subprime loans made in 2005 and 2006. However,
as any researcher will note, these data have limitations;
for a more detailed description of our methodology,
see page 6.2
We have used the best available data to describe the
challenges that our nation and states may face. But the
current policy debate has been limited by the lack of
data on the actual number of loans that have ended in
foreclosure. Policy makers need accurate, comprehensive
and up-to-date information to fully understand their
foreclosure problems and identify potential solutions.
States have an important role to play here, and many are
already building systems that link property descriptions,
mortgage information and foreclosure actions. However,
having 50 idiosyncratic foreclosure databases is not a
solution. Instead, Congress and the states should
consider ways to collect, maintain and share reliable and
uniform information across all 50 states to more
accurately describe current conditions and better assess
the effectiveness of policy interventions.
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Pew’s analysis estimates that one in 33 current
U.S. homeowners nationwide is projected to face
foreclosure, primarily in the next two years, as a
result of a subprime loan made in 2005 and
2006.3
Pew’s analysis of recent mortgage delinquency
data found that subprime loans—high-risk loans
to people who do not qualify for a prime or
conventional loan because of low income or
poor credit—make up just 14 percent of all
mortgage loans being serviced, but more than
half of all loans in foreclosure.4
Nearly every state is affected: in 47 states and
Washington, D.C. the number of mortgage loans
entering foreclosure as of December 2007 had
increased by at least 20 percent since December
2006.5
Pew's analysis found that projected subprime
foreclosure challenges are spread across states
more evenly, indicating that the foreclosure crisis
is nationwide and not merely concentrated in a
few states.6
10 states alone will lose a total of $6.6 billion in
tax revenue in 2008 as a result of the foreclosure
crisis, according to a 2007 projection.7
1.6 million loans were in foreclosure or 90 days
past due as of December 2007—up 55 percent
from a year earlier.8
More than 40.6 million homes across America
are projected to lose value because of subprime
foreclosures in their communities. Foreclosures
may cost neighboring properties up to $356
billion in home value over the next couple of
years.9
U.S. foreclosure starts, as of December 2007,
involving prime adjustable-rate mortgages
increased 158 percent in one year.10
Homes in foreclosure usually sell far below
market value, especially in today’s depressed
real estate market, and unsold properties can be
expensive to maintain. Lenders experience
foreclosure losses ranging from 20 cents to 60
cents on the dollar, with one estimate of a
typical lender’s foreclosure cost averaging
$58,800 in the early 2000s.11
The media have dubbed the current situation a “subprime mortgage crisis.” But the current foreclosure data
and forthcoming trends show a more complex story, one in which a growing number of homeowners and prime
loans are threatened. In short, nearly every homeowner and prospective homeowner is somehow affected by
this crisis.
Summary: Key Facts about 
the Foreclosure Crisis
Overview
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HELPING CONSUMERS AVOID
FORECLOSURE AND STAY IN 
THEIR HOMES 
Nine states have publicly supported mortgage
refinance funds and have committed at least
$450 million in loan funds to help borrowers
avoid foreclosure.12
California, Massachusetts and Ohio are
encouraging lenders to modify defaulted loans
to help homeowners keep their homes.
Nine states have implemented regulations that
prevent foreclosure rescue scams.
20 states have partnered with the
Homeownership Preservation Foundation to
provide around-the clock consumer counseling
hotlines.
States such as Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts
and Ohio have led media campaigns to educate
at-risk borrowers about how to seek help.
California, Indiana and Minnesota mandate that
lenders give borrowers in danger of defaulting
early notice about available assistance.
REDUCING THE NUMBER OF 
HIGH-RISK LOANS BEING MADE
31 states regulate high-cost loan products.
24 states require or recommend consumer
education and counseling.
Nine states require mortgage brokers to
consider or represent the interests of the
borrower when recommending mortgages.
CONVENING STAKEHOLDERS 
TO DEVELOP COMPREHENSIVE
SOLUTIONS
14 states have created foreclosure task forces to
try to address the challenges of the crisis
comprehensively, including bringing government
leaders, lenders, advocates and experts to the
table to work on solutions.
NOTE: See Appendix A for more detail on which states are doing what.
The foreclosure crisis facing America is a national challenge, and it requires a national response. The federal
government must provide leadership and funding to address it. Among other measures, Congress at this
writing is considering proposals that would provide federal funds to expand counseling programs for
homeowners at risk of foreclosure, tax-exempt bonds for localities to refinance subprime loans and a hefty
increase in federally insured mortgages. Congress also is contemplating strengthening underwriting standards.
Pew’s research found that states also have a critical role to play—and today, a growing number of state policy
makers are taking action in three major ways: trying to help borrowers facing imminent risk of foreclosure to
stay in their homes; preventing high-risk, high-cost mortgage loans from being made in the first place; and
taking a comprehensive approach to the crisis by convening stakeholders to develop solutions. 
Summary: How States Have
Responded to the Crisis
Overview
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Section 1.0 
The research reviews and analyzes two principal
data sets, one from the Mortgage Bankers
Association’s (MBA) 4Q 2007 National
Delinquency Survey and, second, from the
Center for Responsible Lending’s (CRL)
foreclosure projections and subprime spillover
estimates. Both data sets are widely cited and
used to understand the nature and magnitude of
the nation’s foreclosure challenges, but both also
have limitations. 
The Mortgage Bankers Association Data
The MBA quarterly data are based on survey
sampling techniques and offer a point in time
picture of loans in various stages of delinquency
or in the foreclosure process. While they
represent an estimate of the foreclosure
challenges, they do not reflect the number of
actual foreclosures that were finalized at the end
of a given quarter. They also do not account for
foreclosures that moved through the process
and are no longer a part of the inventory. The
MBA foreclosure estimates refer to all loans in
the foreclosure process as well as loans that are
seriously delinquent—90 days past due. We
total the foreclosure inventory with the seriously
delinquent loans to provide a snapshot of the
estimated number of foreclosures at the end of
2007, because one can reasonably expect,
looking at past trends, that loans 90 days past
due likely will be referred to start foreclosure
proceedings.
The Center for Responsible Lending Data
CRL’s data are materially different than the MBA
information and have different limitations. CRL's
primary data, which was used to build the
models for the cumulative foreclosure
projections, came from a private source that
aggregated securitized loans from various
lenders who had identified them as subprime.
CRL had access to the data through a
contractual arrangement with the provider. The
CRL foreclosure projections were recently
updated to be more comparable to subprime
foreclosure estimates from Moody’s
Economy.com (http://judiciary.house.gov/media/
pdfs/Zandi080129.pdf) and Merrill Lynch (The
Market Economist, December 14, 2007). CRL
also used data on outstanding subprime loans
reported by the MBA in its 3Q 2007 National
Delinquency Survey to calculate these updated
foreclosure estimates. The MBA data are also
the source for the subprime foreclosure starts.
Like CRL’s original projections from its Losing
Ground study (December 2006), the updated
data reflect only loans to owner-occupants in the
50 states and Washington, D.C., secured by a
first-lien on a single-family home, condominium,
townhouse or unit in a planned development.
CRL estimates the likelihood that a given loan
will be foreclosed upon for the lifetime of that
loan. In other words, CRL’s estimates take the
total number of subprime loans disbursed during
2005 and 2006 and give the number of loans
they expect will be foreclosed upon. This
estimate includes foreclosures that will occur in
2008 as well as subsequent years, providing a
larger window for foreclosures to occur than the
MBA data. However, by restricting the sample to
subprime loans made in 2005 and 2006 to
owner-occupants, CRL’s estimates miss a number
of loans that will go into foreclosure in that same
time period. More details on CRL’s methodology
can be found in the appendix of the Losing
Ground report at http://www.responsiblelending.
org/ pdfs/foreclosure-paper-report-2-17.pdf. 
CRL also provided subprime spillover data—that
is, projections of the ripple effects of
foreclosures on neighboring properties, and
Our Data, Methodology
and Limitations
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municipalities and states' combined tax bases in
the coming years. CRL calculated the estimated
ripple effects examining 56,777 census tracts in
the nation’s 387 metropolitan statistical areas,
using data on local housing densities and
median house prices for each census tract. CRL’s
study assumed that the predicted foreclosures
were evenly distributed throughout the tract,
and researchers calculated the number of houses
expected to be within an eighth of a mile of
each foreclosure. The expected decline in
property values were calculated using findings
from another widely cited research study that
found that each conventional foreclosure within
an eighth of a mile of a single-family home
results in a decline of 0.9 percent in value. This
loss of equity was then aggregated to the state
level. CRL’s results do not include areas outside
metropolitan statistical areas. One of the
limitations, however, of this analysis is that it
does not account for market variations and,
while appropriate, the foreclosure projections
from depreciating values and the average loss
value may not reflect the potential differences
around these values. CRL’s foreclosure
projections and subprime spillover data rely on 
a number of assumptions. For a full and detailed
description of the assumptions and their caveats,
please see http://www.responsiblelending.org/
issues/mortgage/research/. 
Other sources of foreclosure data may show
different estimates, although the relative order of
magnitude should be consistent. In many
communities, vendors have developed databases
of foreclosure filings with the intent of selling the
information to real estate speculators interested
in purchasing discounted property. These data
vendors frequently receive media attention, but
the quality of their data can be questionable.
Policy makers should use a variety of data
sources to monitor foreclosure trends in key
markets and should also validate the data
carefully before using it to make critical decisions.
Section 2.0
We conducted extensive interviews and
document reviews to highlight state responses
to the mounting foreclosure challenges facing all
50 states and the nation as a whole. In the
section highlighting state actions, researchers
describe the legislative and regulatory actions
states have taken to try to mitigate the damage
to homeowners, localities and state budgets. It
is critical to note that we did not seek to
evaluate the effectiveness of these responses,
principally because most actions are relatively
new and the data do not yet exist. While many
state policy makers and researchers believe that
these approaches are promising, the jury is still
out on whether and to what degree they will
deliver positive results. 
Supplemental Fact Sheets and
Estimated Number of Foreclosures
Per Homeowner
For the nation overall and for each state, we
projected the number of foreclosures per
number of overall homeowners in the state that
are anticipated to take place, primarily over the
next two years, because of subprime loans. We
developed individual fact sheets for the 50
states and Washington, D.C. that profile each
state's foreclosure challenges and responses to
those challenges to date. We calculated the
ratio of projected foreclosures per owner-
occupied housing units (homeowner), which
allows us to account for the relative size of the
states in estimating the relative impact of the
subprime crisis. The U.S. Census Bureau’s 2006
American Community Survey was used to obtain
estimates for owner-occupied housing units. We
used a method similar to the one used by
RealtyTrac, a real estate Web site that tracks
foreclosure properties, to rank the states.
However, we used owner-occupied housing units
as the denominator because our foreclosure
projections are for loans to owner-occupants
(homeowners).

WWW.PEWCENTERONTHESTATES.ORG 9
The Foreclosure Wave Is Just
Beginning
Based on projections by CRL, Pew estimates that
one in 33 current U.S. homeowners will
experience foreclosure, largely in the next two
years, the direct result of subprime loans made
in 2005 and 2006.
In 2007, predatory lending practices, aggressive
loan marketing and the proliferation of high-cost
subprime loans all converged into a perfect
storm to push subprime mortgage foreclosures
to record levels. (See Appendix B for an
explanation of subprime lending and the
foreclosure process.) As of December 2007, 2.9
million mortgage loans were past due, and while
subprime loans account for only 14 percent of
mortgage loans being serviced, they represent
more than 50 percent of loans in foreclosure.13
Now, in early 2008, the pace of foreclosures
continues to pick up. RealtyTrac, a real estate
Web site that tracks foreclosure properties,
released its 2007 U.S. Foreclosure Market Report,
finding that loans in some stage of foreclosure
were up 79 percent from the previous year.14 In
fact, most experts predict more than one million
foreclosures will occur by 2009, particularly if
home values continue to decline.15
As Exhibit 1 illustrates, nearly every state is
feeling the impact of the crisis. A report by the
MBA in March 2008 showed that in 47 states
and Washington, D.C. mortgage loans entering
foreclosure as of December 2007 had increased
by at least 20 percent since December 2006.
Only three states—Alaska, Montana and
Vermont—did not experience at least a 20
percent increase in foreclosure starts; less than 1
percent of the American population lives in
those states.
The pain of the credit crisis has spread to prime
borrowers, those with solid credit histories. In
December 2007, 4.51 percent of prime
borrowers were in delinquency or default on
their mortgages—the highest rate since the
MBA began tracking prime borrowers separately
in 1998. Like subprime mortgages, many recent
prime loans were adjustable-rate mortgages
(ARM) that allowed consumers to pay little
initially and more as the interest rates reset. With
home prices falling and credit tightening, prime
borrowers are facing the same financial stress as
those with subprime credit.
In fact, U.S. foreclosure starts involving prime
ARMs increased by 158 percent during the 12
months ending in the fourth quarter of 2007,
according to the MBA. Arizona, Florida, Nevada
and California were among the states hit hardest
by ARM foreclosure starts.
Just the Facts
THE SCOPE AND SCALE OF THE CRISIS
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…most experts 
predict more than 
one million foreclosures
will occur by 2009, 
particularly if home values continue
to decline.
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Exhibit
1
THE FULL PICTURE: THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS
Projected Foreclosures and Ripple Effects Projected Foreclosures Per Homeowner
(Primarily 2008-2009) (Primarily 2008-2009)
Total Estimated Estimated No. of Decrease in House Owner-occupied Number of Projected
Number of Foreclosures From Neighboring Homes Value/Tax Base housing units, Foreclosures to
State Foreclosures, Subprime Loans Experiencing from Foreclosure 2006 Homeowners
December 2007 2005-2006 Devaluation Effect (millions)
Alabama 23,013 21,330 209,052 $406 1,289,272 1 out of 60
Alaska 1,135 3,831 47,404 $190 148,249 1 out of 39
Arizona 38,048 85,726 1,201,327 $8,687 1,523,041 1 out of 18
Arkansas 8,452 11,734 71,351 $131 753,412 1 out of 64
California 228,133 355,682 7,505,584 $107,196 7,102,197 1 out of 20
Colorado 32,040 49,923 748,652 $3,183 1,269,421 1 out of 25
Connecticut 13,808 18,847 441,018 $2,039 921,382 1 out of 49
Delaware 5,274 5,551 90,615 $390 238,194 1 out of 43
District of Columbia 1,966 4,190 223,797 $4,287 114,586 1 out of 27
Florida 186,093 194,796 3,667,230 $35,856 4,994,101 1 out of 26
Georgia 67,126 83,686 630,218 $1,817 2,285,179 1 out of 27
Hawaii 3,204 8,832 167,942 $4,160 257,599 1 out of 29
Idaho 4,288 10,035 97,029 $304 390,982 1 out of 39
Illinois 69,251 87,918 2,536,938 $27,297 3,301,367 1 out of 38
Indiana 49,069 48,034 544,991 $959 1,756,328 1 out of 37
Iowa 10,800 11,190 178,166 $344 885,969 1 out of 79
Kansas 9,682 14,347 200,403 $382 761,022 1 out of 53
Kentucky 17,241 21,153 249,727 $498 1,167,081 1 out of 55
Louisiana 19,621 26,306 400,306 $1,032 1,071,667 1 out of 41
Maine 5,064 6,597 42,127 $134 399,076 1 out of 60
Maryland 27,491 55,693 1,220,574 $12,133 1,450,411 1 out of 26
Massachusetts 26,787 32,976 1,013,548 $7,992 1,588,359 1 out of 48
Michigan 91,081 79,893 1,414,411 $3,798 2,908,273 1 out of 36
Minnesota 31,359 38,991 545,773 $2,254 1,558,206 1 out of 40
Mississippi 13,502 15,439 77,449 $144 760,318 1 out of 49
Missouri 27,366 42,727 705,446 $1,792 1,628,838 1 out of 38
Montana 2,117 3,225 16,790 $42 260,137 1 out of 81
Nebraska 5,504 7,390 132,896 $250 475,899 1 out of 64
Nevada 28,783 51,881 557,286 $6,537 580,705 1 out of 11
New Hampshire 6,599 7,422 57,628 $203 363,652 1 out of 49
New Jersey 40,074 57,083 1,781,424 $19,573 2,110,308 1 out of 37
New Mexico 4,959 9,093 151,430 $513 505,915 1 out of 56
New York 61,978 124,601 3,552,642 $65,136 3,940,942 1 out of 32
North Carolina 37,062 53,254 332,375 $861 2,350,798 1 out of 44
North Dakota 891 1,103 23,761 $51 181,666 1 out of 165
Ohio 91,188 85,618 1,392,990 $2,850 3,150,239 1 out of 37
Oklahoma 14,727 20,157 256,261 $427 950,407 1 out of 47
Oregon 8,578 27,827 466,877 $2,549 939,123 1 out of 34
Pennsylvania 52,069 76,055 1,684,475 $6,582 3,475,105 1 out of 46
Rhode Island 5,530 8,170 244,424 $1,713 255,495 1 out of 31
South Carolina 21,797 27,996 179,309 $477 1,165,464 1 out of 42
South Dakota 1,564 1,860 18,982 $38 216,212 1 out of 116
Tennessee 31,020 46,218 441,703 $967 1,660,152 1 out of 36
Texas 99,495 149,661 2,283,390 $4,923 5,291,045 1 out of 35
Utah 7,025 23,286 310,442 $1,317 585,929 1 out of 25
Vermont 1,344 2,122 6,460 $22 182,389 1 out of 86
Virginia 30,372 62,174 1,035,979 $6,953 2,030,284 1 out of 33
Washington 16,847 42,036 846,526 $4,893 1,620,052 1 out of 39
West Virginia 4,002 6,218 40,886 $80 554,791 1 out of 89
Wisconsin 21,049 26,334 557,251 $1,900 1,571,129 1 out of 60
Wyoming 964 2,246 18,630 $46 144,117 1 out of 64
US Total/average 1,606,430 2,258,457 40,621,895 $356,310 75,086,485 1 out of 33
SOURCES: Foreclosure estimates from Pew Center on the States 2008, based on Mortgage Bankers Association, National Delinquency Survey (March 2008), Center for Responsible
Lending, Subprime Spillover (Revised January 31, 2008), http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/mortgage/research/subprime-spillover.html (accessed February 14, 2007). Projections
revised February 28, 2008. Number of owner-occupied housing units from U.S. Census Bureau, 2006 American Community Survey, U.S. Department of Commerce: Washington, D.C.
NOTES: Estimated foreclosures in 2007 include the foreclosure inventory and seriously delinquent loans (90 days or more). MBA estimates how many loans in a particular quarter are
delinquent or are concluding the foreclosure process; it takes into account all loans originated, including loans that were originated in the prior quarter that are likely to have started the
foreclosure process. CRL’s numbers reflect all loans originated in 2005-2006 and estimate the total number of loans in that vintage that will end up in foreclosure. CRL’s projections of
subprime foreclosures and spillover impact were updated to reflect newer estimates of subprime defaults as reported by Merrill Lynch (The Market Economist, December 14, 2007) and
Moody’s Economy.com (http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/Zandi080129.pdf). Additionally, foreclosure estimates were calculated using outstanding subprime loans reported by the
MBA in its 3Q 2007 National Delinquency Survey; the latter was also the source for the subprime foreclosure starts. Spillover results do not include areas outside of metropolitan
statistical areas. For additional information about the Center for Responsible Lending’s methodology and its caveats, see link to Subprime Spillover report above. The number of
projected foreclosures to current homeowners was calculated by dividing CRL’s number of projected foreclosures to owner-occupant subprime loans by the number of owner-occupant
households reported by the U.S. Census.
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Although dire, the MBA’s “point in time”
foreclosure statistics do not show the full extent of
the foreclosure problem, because they do not
include the high number of subprime loans made
recently that have yet to enter their peak
foreclosure years. In a December 2006 study,
CRL, which receives funding from Pew, estimated
that one in every five subprime mortgages made
in 2005 and 2006 ultimately will end in
foreclosure.16 These projections have been
updated for this report and refer to projected
actual homes lost, not to late payments or
foreclosures started but not completed. Based on
historic patterns of default, states with higher
numbers of subprime loans made in 2005 will be
the most likely to have higher default (past due)
and foreclosure rates in 2007 (see Exhibit 1 for
the number of projected foreclosures).17
Based on an analysis of CRL’s foreclosure
projections, more challenges are looming. In the
coming years, 2.26 million homeowners are likely
to lose their homes as a result of their subprime
loans made in 2005 and 2006. This translates to
one in 33 homeowners nationally. In addition,
unlike the MBA data (see Exhibit 2) that show
that loans in the foreclosure process and over 90
days delinquent (estimated foreclosures) are
concentrated in a few states, CRL’s projections
indicate the challenges are spread across states
more evenly. Because CRL’s projections focus
exclusively on subprime loans made to owner-
occupants in 2005 and 2006, they provide a
conservative estimate of foreclosures in the
coming years. The CRL data do not account for
prime borrowers, investors or other loan types.
(See Pew’s supplemental state fact sheets for a
state-by-state analysis of foreclosure estimates
and their projected ripple effects on neighboring
properties.)
A recent study estimates that correcting the
current crisis could take up to five years.18 The
current wave of foreclosures originated largely
from loans with adjustable “teaser” rates that
reset to higher payments that borrowers cannot
afford. The bulk of these loans will reset in 2008
and 2009, continuing until late 2011. Another
study suggests that more than eight million
loans will reset and nearly 1.9 million will
foreclose, assuming house prices continue to
drop.19
Some States and Communities
Have Been Hit Especially Hard
More than half of all the nation’s loans in
foreclosure and seriously delinquent loans—90
days past due—are concentrated in seven states.
As Exhibit 2 shows, while California has the
largest share of all foreclosures in the U.S., it also
has the largest share of U.S. loans. Ohio,
Michigan, Illinois and Indiana, on the other hand,
have a significantly larger share of all
foreclosures and seriously delinquent loans than
they do mortgage loans.
Within each state, foreclosures tend to be
concentrated in neighborhoods that have
disproportionately high shares of subprime
lending. These areas typically are made up of
non-white families with modest incomes. This
geographic concentration of foreclosures further
reduces the value of properties owned by lower-
income residents in already weakened housing
markets.
Everyone Suffers the Consequences 
Foreclosure can have a devastating impact on
homeowners and their families. It can ruin their
credit for years, adversely affect their jobs and
children’s schooling, and take away what for
many Americans is their principal investment
opportunity and chance to get ahead. But the
consequences stretch far beyond the exterior
walls of their home. 
Homes in foreclosure usually sell far below market
value, especially in today’s real estate market, and
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unsold properties can be expensive to maintain.
Lenders experience foreclosure losses ranging
from 20 cents to 60 cents on the dollar, with one
estimate of a typical lender’s foreclosure cost
averaging $58,800 in the early 2000s.20
And neighbors and communities feel significant
ripple effects. Close to 41 million homes across
the nation are projected to decline in value by
an average of $8,800 because of subprime
foreclosures that take place nearby, according to
CRL’s estimate of the impact of foreclosures from
subprime mortgages made in 2005 and 2006. In
addition, communities will likely experience a
$356 billion cumulative decrease in their house
values and tax base from nearby foreclosures as
a result of loans made in this two-year time
period.21 (See Exhibit 1 for a state-by-state
breakdown of projected reduced property
values/tax base.) Moreover, homes in the
foreclosure process may become vacant, leading
to increased crime and other problems in the
neighborhood.22
State and local governments—and taxpayers—
likely will experience significant fiscal pain. One
study, focused on the City of Chicago, estimates
that an abandoned, foreclosed property on
average costs a municipality approximately
$7,000, although it can rack up more than
$30,000 in police, fire and code enforcement
costs.23 A 2007 analysis by Global Insight, a
global economic and financial analysis firm,
projects that property values will decline by
$519 billion in 2008 due to the number of
homes in foreclosure from all loans, which
depresses resale values over and above the
decline expected from cyclical decreases in
home values. For state and local governments
that rely heavily on property taxes, real estate
fees and sales taxes, this could mean a serious
drop in revenue. The same study estimates that
10 states alone will lose a total of $6.6 billion in
tax revenue in 2008.24
State governments and municipalities also are
facing losses on subprime investments. Several
state- and county-run investment pools—used
by thousands of school, fire, water and other
local districts—hold interests in structured
investment vehicles that include subprime loans.
“Nobody knows how much more pain is coming.
State funds could lose hundreds of millions of
dollars,” said Lynn Turner, chief accountant of
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
from 1998 to 2001.25
Finally, as recent news headlines suggest, the
foreclosure crisis is wreaking havoc on the
nation’s economy at large. One study suggests
foreclosures will reduce U.S. economic activity
by $166 billion in 2008 because of declines in
the real estate and construction industries and in
consumer spending.26
The widespread impact of the crisis underscores
a critical point: Everyone—borrowers, lenders,
regulators, advocates, researchers and policy
makers—must work together to find solutions. 
The 10 states where estimated foreclosures are the most prevalent.
P
SOURCE: Pew Center on the States 2008, based on data from Mortgage Bankers Association 
National Delinquency Survey, (March 2008)
NOTE: Foreclosure numbers above reflect loans in the foreclosure process and 90 days delinquent 
at the end of 2007.
$
Percentage of all 
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Percentage of all 
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THE HARDEST HIT: Where Foreclosures 
Are The Most Prevalent, December 2007Exhibit2
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WHY THE CRISIS IS HITTING NOW
For state and local policy makers, identifying the
right set of reforms depends in part on
understanding the cause of the problem.
Loans Become More Accessible—
and Bring Higher Risk
In recent years, mortgage lending has
fundamentally changed. More than 10,000
lending institutions were in business 20 years
ago; today, just a few dozen lenders dominate.
The source of capital for loans used to be
deposits made by consumers and businesses;
now the source is primarily bonds issued in
financial markets. Loans today are often made
by independent brokers who work on behalf of
multiple lenders and who are compensated
based on the size and terms of the loan rather
than on how the loan performs. 
Historically, borrowers who received loans had to
meet rigid qualification requirements. But the
advent of credit scoring and more
comprehensive consumer data has allowed
mortgage loans to be priced according to the
calculated risk of mortgage applicants. These
new mechanisms have enabled millions of
borrowers to access credit they would have been
denied in the past—but this access puts
borrowers and lenders at risk of making serious
financial mistakes and puts borrowers at risk of
being preyed upon by unscrupulous lenders. 
The Housing Market Booms, 
2002-2006
From 2002 to 2006, home prices in many areas
exceeded sustainable levels. Record numbers of
loans were pushed through the mortgage
lending system, with real estate markets
promoting homes as an investment with rapid
double-digit returns. Liberal lending practices
allowed for growing numbers of prime and
subprime loans requiring no minimum
downpayment; loans with adjustable or “teaser”
rates that, after a short time, required payments
often well beyond what the borrower could
afford; loans that did not pay down principal
(and in some cases even allowed it to grow);
loan applications without documentation proving
that the borrower could actually afford the loan;
and overly aggressive real estate appraisers and
loan brokers. 
The Housing Bubble Bursts, 2006
During the housing boom, borrowers were told
routinely that if all else failed, they could simply
refinance their loans. However, when home
prices stopped rising at record rates, the
housing bubble burst and many borrowers found
they owed more than their homes were worth.
Investors providing mortgage capital lost
confidence that loans were valuable assets. And
as lenders began to tighten their loan
requirements, many borrowers no longer had
the option to refinance. 
Foreclosures Increase Significantly,
2007
In the past, foreclosures often resulted from a
change in the borrower’s situation: illness, job loss,
divorce and the like. These problems still cause
homeowners to default, but many of today’s
foreclosures result from the structure of the loans
themselves. A growing number of borrowers are
missing payments because, as interest rates and
monthly payment amounts reset, they can no
longer afford the loan. In general, lenders do not
benefit from foreclosure—so before initiating that
process, many seek to offer borrowers other
options. In fact, housing industry estimates
suggest that of all the homes that entered the
foreclosure process between 2001 and 2005, at
least half of the borrowers were projected to have
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avoided foreclosure because they were able to
catch up on their loan payments or work out a
new payment plan.27 The potential “workout
plans” include:
• Forbearance, in which borrowers reduce or
suspend their payments for a period of time
• Repayment plans that enable a borrower to
add past due amounts to future monthly
payments
• Loan modifications that allow borrowers to
add past due amounts to the principal
balance, extend the term of the loan or
reduce the interest rate
• Sales assistance, in which lenders help by
making referrals to real estate agents and
putting the home on the market with the
understanding that the borrower will pay
off the mortgage when the home sells
• Deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, in which the
borrower returns the property to the
investor, then walks away without a
foreclosure mark on his or her credit history 
• Pre-foreclosure sale (or “short” sale), in
which the property is sold for less than is
owed on the mortgage
But too many borrowers do not take advantage
of these options. In fact, some researchers have
estimated that as many as half of all borrowers
who go into foreclosure never even contacted
their lenders beforehand.28 Why? Experts cite a
number of reasons: borrowers are unaware of
the alternatives; they are distracted by other
family crises, such as illness or job loss; they are
ashamed of the stigma of foreclosure; or they
do not trust lenders. In addition, loans may be
sold multiple times, making it unclear who
actually controls them—so borrowers often do
not know who to contact for help.
STATES SHOULD ACT NOW
As described above, America’s foreclosure crisis
is likely to get worse before it gets better—and
the impact will be felt not just by residents who
lose their homes, but also by their neighbors,
communities, municipalities, states and U.S.
taxpayers as a whole. Homeownership is a
fundamental aspect of families’ financial security,
but—as this report makes clear—it also is critical
to state and local governments’ fiscal health. 
Federal policy makers must work to curb abusive
subprime home loans and to strengthen
underwriting standards, including, for example,
such common-sense practices as requiring
lenders to verify a borrower’s income to help
assure they can pay a loan’s teaser rate and the
rate after the loan adjusts. But states also have
an important—and immediate—role to play.
Across the country, a growing number of policy
leaders are recognizing the need to continue to
encourage buyers to invest in homes—but to do
so fully informed, with accurate information from
scrupulous sources. Policy makers also
understand the importance of helping buyers
stay in their homes so that they can build equity
and contribute to the stability and fiscal health
of their communities, towns, states and nation. 
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What can states do to stem the tide of
foreclosures? While some may argue that
tightening underwriting standards is no longer
necessary, history has shown these problems will
recur if action is not taken. Thus, states can
regulate future subprime lending and create
resources to help their residents avoid
foreclosure. State housing finance agencies can
be active in the mortgage market and they can
use their access to capital through bonds.
Governors can use their bully pulpits to promote
consumer education and awareness. State
attorneys general can help develop
comprehensive plans to manage defaults and
foreclosures and play an important role in
convening industry leaders who want to—and
need to—be part of the solution. And state and
local leaders can help encourage the federal
government to take aggressive action to curb
foreclosures and prevent more problems in the
future through tighter regulation of lender
practices. A growing number of states are
pursuing a full range of policies to help
homeowners and taxpayers mitigate the harm of
the foreclosure crisis.
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STATES RESPOND: HELPING HOMEOWNERS PREVENT FORECLOSURE
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SOURCE: Pew Center on the States 2008,
based on research by PolicyLab Consulting
NOTE: Nevada has a proposed hotline as of 2007.
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have foreclosure
intervention
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have a hotline
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have statewide
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Exhibit
3
Federal Action to Curb 
High-Cost Lending
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) covers
loans with high interest rates and fees, requiring added
disclosures and banning certain product features. HOEPA is
focused on refinance and home equity loans (also called
“Section 32” loans); first lien mortgages with an annual
percentage rate (APR) higher than 8 percentage points above
the rate on Treasury securities of comparable maturity (usually
a 30-year Treasury bond) and second mortgages with an APR
more than 10 percentage points greater are also covered.
HOEPA also applies when total fees and points are higher
than 8 percent of the total loan amount (or more than $547
in 2007 if the loan is under $6,800). HOEPA includes the
following provisions:
• HOEPA loans may not contain balloon payments due
in fewer than five years and may not allow negative
amortization, where monthly payments are too small
to pay off the loan and inevitably cause an increase in
the amount owed.
• HOEPA loans cannot contain prepayment penalties
lasting more than five years.
• Lenders are required to underwrite loans based on
the borrower’s ability to repay the loan and may not
‘flip’ or refinance a HOEPA loan into another HOEPA
loan within the first 12 months, unless the new loan is
in the borrower's best interest.
Because of the high interest rate and fee thresholds that
trigger federal restrictions under HOEPA, it is widely
considered to affect few high-cost mortgages. More than a
dozen states have followed the HOEPA model while taking
a more comprehensive approach to high-cost lending.
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STATES ARE TAKING ACTION 
States are exploring reforms in at least three key
areas: (1) helping borrowers avoid foreclosure
and stay in their homes; (2) preventing
problematic loans from being made in the first
place; and (3) forming state task forces that can
convene all the major stakeholders to develop
comprehensive solutions. 
To help borrowers avoid foreclosure and keep
their homes, 20 states have launched formal
foreclosure intervention or prevention initiatives.
And 16 states have enacted both high-cost
lending and foreclosure intervention laws (see
Appendix A). In addition, 13 states have created
counseling hotlines to help those at risk of
foreclosure, and several states are encouraging
lenders to work with borrowers to find
alternatives to foreclosure.29
Nine states have established loan funds that can
be used to refinance borrowers who have loans
they cannot afford or to provide short-term loans
to help borrowers overcome financial difficulties
(see Exhibit 4 on page 21). To date, a total of at
least $450 million in loan funds has been
committed by states as a means of helping
borrowers avoid foreclosure through short-term or
emergency loans30. To protect vulnerable
borrowers from unscrupulous real estate investors,
nine states have created laws regulating firms that
claim to “rescue” borrowers from default. 
In an effort to prevent problematic loans from
being made, 31 states (see Exhibit 5 on page
24) have implemented laws that address
predatory lending. The strongest of these laws
extend and expand the provisions of the federal
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
(HOEPA), which regulates very high-cost
subprime loans that carry high rates or fees (see
“Federal Action to Curb High-Cost Lending”).
However, most of those state laws, passed
between 2002 and 2004, cover only a small
portion of the total subprime loans made in the
state—those with the highest rates or fees. More
recently, a few states have addressed reckless
underwriting through broader statutes that apply
to subprime loans generally (see Appendix A).
All 50 states have laws designed to regulate
mortgage brokers or originators. However, only
nine states require that mortgage brokers
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consider or represent the interests of the
borrower when recommending mortgages (see
Exhibit 5 and Appendix A).
Finally, 14 states have created foreclosure task
forces to try to address the crisis comprehensively.
These task forces not only assess the specific
challenges faced by their states, but also bring
together relevant stakeholders to develop
informed recommendations for lawmakers (see
Appendix A).
Nearly all of the actions described above were
launched in the past two years. 
Expand Counseling and Legal
Assistance for At-Risk Borrowers 
Foreclosures can be avoided: In the current
market, loan workouts may not be as effective as
they were a short time ago.31 Nonetheless, the
first step is for the homeowner to seek help. 
Approximately 20 states have partnered with the
Homeownership Preservation Foundation (HPF),
which provides education and 24-hour
counseling services through the “Homeowner’s
HOPE Hotline.” Currently, HPF coordinates six
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD)-certified housing counseling
agencies to provide phone counseling. In
addition, HPF has developed relationships with
key servicing institutions to connect borrowers
directly with their loan servicers if appropriate.
This program plans to expand its capacity in
2008 to become the primary contact point for
troubled borrowers. 
In Colorado, a state initiative illustrates the value
borrowers place on one-on-one, face-to-face
time with a counselor. The Colorado Foreclosure
Prevention Hotline, launched in February 2006 in
response to a large number of requests for
foreclosure prevention counseling, provides a
toll-free number for Colorado residents to call
for help. Callers are routed to a local service that
can provide face-to-face counseling. Colorado’s
hotline reports that 85 percent of callers
preferred appointments with local counseling
agencies over telephone counseling. 
Marketing activities and a strong leadership role
by Colorado’s governor have successfully raised
awareness of the hotline. The average monthly
volume for the hotline is 1,769 calls, and year-to-
date figures as of November 2007 showed that
more than 18,000 calls had been placed to the
hotline.32 A recent survey suggests that this
approach is working: Four out of five callers who
received counseling avoided foreclosure.33 The
success of the program stems from pairing
homeowners at risk of foreclosure with local
housing counselors in their community who can
provide information about options in lieu of
foreclosure. Counselors also help borrowers
negotiate and communicate with their lenders.
To date, a total of 
at least $450 million 
in loan funds has 
been committed by states as a
means of helping borrowers avoid
foreclosure through short-term or
emergency loans.
Sectio
n
2
.0
State
Policy
R
esp
onses
HELPING BORROWERS AVOID FORECLOSURE 
AND KEEP THEIR HOMES
DEFAULTING ON THE DREAM: STATES RESPOND TO AMERICA’S FORECLOSURE CRISIS18
Similarly, Michigan’s Save the Dream hotline,
operated by the Michigan State Housing
Development Authority, was launched in 2007 to
direct homeowners to a housing counselor in
their county. The hotline was launched along
with two new statewide loan refinance initiatives
for borrowers facing default.
Many borrowers require legal assistance in
addition to counseling. In Ohio, a statewide task
force recommended improving homeowner
access to legal information and counsel as part
of the foreclosure process, as well as providing
incentives for private attorneys to volunteer to
represent borrowers in foreclosure cases. The
task force also encouraged the governor and 
the court system to single out and publicly
“recognize and honor attorneys who willingly
recognize their essential role in mitigating the
serious effect of the foreclosure crisis on Ohio’s
citizens and its economy.”34
Notify Borrowers About Help
Earlier in the Process 
In general, borrowers often do not know 
where to turn when they face a financial 
problem that prevents them from making a
mortgage payment. Many borrowers are
reluctant to call their lenders and most lack
information about the alternatives that lenders
can offer. In addition, borrowers may be unaware
of the services that counselors or legal services
can provide to help them reach an agreement
with lenders.
Several states have explored ways to ensure that
borrowers receive information about possible
workout options that may help them avoid
foreclosure early in the foreclosure process and
to encourage borrowers at risk to work with
lenders to obtain a loan modification or workout
plan as soon as possible. California, Indiana and
Minnesota, for instance, are working to have
servicers and lenders provide borrowers with
information about their options earlier in the
foreclosure process. 
• California regulators have sought voluntary
agreements with servicers to reach out to
borrowers with high-risk, adjustable-rate
loans so they can prepare for upcoming
payment changes. 
• Indiana requires that information about
state-provided resources be included in
foreclosure notices. 
• Minnesota has required lenders to notify
borrowers about state foreclosure
counseling and assistance as well as about
the availability of a referral service that
provides access to HUD-approved 
housing counseling. 
As long as resources are in place and lenders are
willing to work with borrowers, these approaches
could help borrowers proactively cure a default
before the foreclosure progresses. 
In addition, state leaders in Indiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts and Ohio have developed 
media campaigns to convey the message that
borrowers at risk of default can and should seek
help. The campaigns include statements issued
by the governor, press releases, Web site links
and brochures providing service referrals. 
Private lenders have been supportive of these
approaches and, in some cases, have provided
funding for public awareness campaigns.
Encourage Lenders to Modify
Loans in Default
One of the most important state efforts so far
has been to encourage lenders to voluntarily
modify loans that are likely to go into default or
are already in default. While most lenders and
servicers have shown a preference for modifying
loans on a case-by-case basis, state leaders—
from governors to directors of bank supervisory
agencies—have pushed financial institutions to
modify adjustable-rate loans that
meet certain criteria in order to affect
more at-risk loans and have a greater
impact on the problem. 
Examples include efforts by
governors in Arizona, California and
Ohio, each of whom has worked with
major lenders to obtain some
agreement to modify loans on a
broader scale. In addition, the
Conference of State Banking
Supervisors and a select group of
state attorneys general have been
exploring regulatory, statutory and
legal actions to facilitate loan
modifications for mortgages with
significant short-term payment
shocks. 
These state-level efforts face a
federally created obstacle. In fall
2007, the U.S. Department of Treasury and the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) launched the “HOPE
NOW” alliance to encourage housing
counselors, loan servicers, investors and other
mortgage market participants to form an alliance
to “maximize outreach efforts to homeowners in
distress to help them stay in their homes and
create a unified, coordinated plan to reach and
support as many homeowners as possible.”35
HOPE NOW (discussed in greater detail in
Section 3.0) represents 11 lenders servicing
more than four out of five subprime loans, or 80
percent of the subprime market. Last December,
the HOPE NOW alliance proposed a plan to
freeze the interest rates for five years on loans
that had been expected to go up. While the
proposal intends to help borrowers by freezing
interest rates, the problem is that this approach
creates a template for wholesale loan
modifications and could limit states’ abilities to
negotiate an across-the-board extension of the
terms of the loan, such as converting a 30-year
loan to a 40-year loan, which would result in
lower monthly payments, or a reduction in the
amounts owed. Indeed, the State Foreclosure
Prevention Working Group—comprising
attorneys general and banking regulators from
11 states, including California, Iowa, New York
and North Carolina—has noted that resets are
not the key issue for many homeowners who are
falling behind on their monthly payments.
Chicago’s HOPI City Model
In 2002, the city of Chicago and NHS Chicago, a leading
nonprofit community development agency, began an initiative
to address a near doubling of foreclosures in the city, most of
which were concentrated in low-income neighborhoods where
increasing numbers of vacant buildings began appearing on
once stable blocks. Working with the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago, NHS launched the Home Ownership Preservation
Initiative (HOPI) with key lending, investment and servicing
institutions. Seeking to preserve sustainable homeownership
and to reclaim foreclosed homes as neighborhood assets,
HOPI has met at least twice, annually releasing research on
foreclosure trends and developing innovative new
strategies, many of which have been replicated nationally.
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Governors in California,
Massachusetts and Ohio
have encouraged lenders 
to modify loan terms on a larger scale.
The Conference of State Banking
Supervisors and a select group of 
state attorneys general have been 
exploring regulatory, statutory and legal
actions to facilitate loan modifications 
for mortgages with significant payment
shocks in the short term.
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According to the working group’s analysis from
February 2008, more than 30 percent of
borrowers with subprime loans and/or ARMs—
representing about 365,000 of the 1.1 million
delinquent loans—are already at least 30 days
past due on their mortgage payments even
though they have not yet seen their first rate
reset.36 The interest rate freeze negotiated
through HOPE NOW would not help these
consumers. Still, states are encouraged by 
HOPE NOW to work with lenders and servicers
to identify ways to ensure that objective
standards are used to modify loans for a broad
group of borrowers and to encourage lenders to
reach the most borrowers possible through a
wholesale approach.
Provide Publicly Supported, 
Short-Term Loans and Mortgage
Refinance Funds for Borrowers
Collectively, nine states have committed at least
$450 million to homeowners facing foreclosure—
to provide short-term or emergency loans to help
borrowers overcome their financial difficulties (see
Exhibit 4). These loan funds typically are funded
by public and private sources, including proceeds
from taxable bond issues. In other situations,
pools are guaranteed or insured by state agencies
to encourage private lenders to participate. 
States have provided funding for short-term
interventions designed to help borrowers when
foreclosure proceedings are imminent. While these
programs have proved effective in responding to
significant job losses or other economic
disruptions (for example, family or health
emergencies), the changing nature of foreclosures
brings new challenges. These emergency loan
funds may be less effective in the current crisis
because today’s foreclosures are often the result of
the loans themselves: the terms may have already
damaged the financial stability of the borrower,
and the loan may be based on a housing value
that has already diminished. Nonetheless, state
loan funds have an important role to play in
keeping communities stable by helping ensure
that credit remains available for consumers when
they need it—especially with housing values
weakening and credit tightening up. 
Pennsylvania’s Homeowners’ Emergency
Mortgage Assistance Program (HEMAP) was one
of the first state-led foreclosure assistance funds.
Launched in the 1980s, when the state
experienced record unemployment due to a
massive transition away from manufacturing jobs,
the program provides a limited number of short-
term loans (up to two years and a maximum of
$60,000) to help borrowers bridge a period of
unemployment. Loans are restricted to borrowers
who are in default but have made good-faith
efforts to make payments. All borrowers must
work with local nonprofit housing counselors.
HEMAP provides funds to nonprofit agencies to
counsel delinquent homeowners and to help
them apply for aid. The program makes
mortgage payments directly to lenders on behalf
of the borrowers during the emergency
assistance period. These payments make up the
difference between the applicant’s monthly
contribution and the lender’s required payment.
Pennsylvania requires that all lenders must send a
notice about HEMAP to homeowners who are at
least 60 days delinquent. Since its inception,
Pennsylvania’s program has helped more than
40,000 families maintain their homes.37
HEMAP is considered an exemplary model, and
other states have implemented similar programs.
Delaware, Michigan, Massachusetts and North
Carolina have recently created similar funds to
provide small emergency assistance loans. 
The Minnesota Housing Finance Agency, in
conjunction with 18 nonprofit counseling
agencies, offers counseling and loan funds to
prevent mortgage foreclosure as part of the
state’s Foreclosure Prevention Assistance
Program (FPAP). The program provides
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delinquent mortgage borrowers with financial
and debt-management counseling, help
negotiating with lenders and assistance
accessing emergency loans up to $5,500. Nearly
100 loans equaling approximately $427,000
were made in FY2007 (October 1, 2006 to
September 30, 2007). As in Pennsylvania,
lenders are required to notify delinquent
borrowers about the availability of FPAP
assistance. 
In addition, half a dozen states offer troubled
homeowners the option to refinance loans.
Ohio, for example, launched the Opportunity
Loan Refinance Program in April 2007 to help
borrowers refinance high-cost loans. The
program offers 30-year, fixed-rate loans along
with a 20-year, fixed-rate second mortgage to
help with closing costs for eligible borrowers. 
As of June 2007, the Ohio Housing Finance
Agency (OHFA) planned to make more than 80
loans for approximately $11 million. The new
loans would then be purchased by OHFA using
taxable bonds (at no cost to Ohio taxpayers). To
date, $100 million in taxable bonds have been
allocated to fund the program. And the state’s
Foreclosure Prevention Task Force has asked
OHFA to expand its underwriting criteria so that
more homeowners can qualify for the program.38
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Exhibit
4
THE STATE OF LOAN FUNDS
Amount 
State Fund Use (Committed/Pledged)
Connecticut CT Families Refinance to 30-year, fixed-rate, fully amortizing loans at 0.25 percent $50 million
above Connecticut Housing Finance Agency’s regular rate
Delaware Emergency Mortgage Up to $15,000 emergency loan for borrowers in foreclosure to pay $2 million
Assistance Program past due balance and/or up to 12 future mortgage payments
Maryland Lifeline Refinance Borrowers with ARM or interest-only loans with upcoming reset can $100 million, including 
Mortgage Program receive a 40-year fixed-rate loan, within income limits $10 million loan loss
reserve and $25 million 
in housing agency bonds
Massachusetts Home Saver Foreclosure Borrowers up to 60 days behind and victims of predatory lending $250 million (pledged), 
Prevention Program including $60 million in taxable 
bonds as guarantee
Michigan Adjustable-Rate Refinance ARMs into below-market rate fixed-rate loans before Funded by taxable bonds
Mortgage Refinance delinquent
Rescue Refinance Refinance ARMs into below-market rate fixed-rate loans after Funded by taxable bonds
Program delinquent at risk of losing their home
New Jersey Homeownership Refinance for borrowers who cannot afford the rate reset or other loan $30 million
Preservation terms, or have been denied a loan modification for a 30- and 40-year,
Refinance Program fixed-rate loan. Must meet income and maximum mortgage limits
New York Keep the Dream Alive Borrowers with ARM or interest-only loan with upcoming reset can $100 million
Mortgage Refinance Program receive 40-year, fixed-rate loan, within income limits
Ohio Opportunity Loan Refinance ARMs into fixed-rate loans before delinquent, within $100-500 million in taxable
Refinance Program income limits bond proceeds
($100 million committed)
Pennsylvania Refinance to an Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency buys current loan for borrowers $25 million bond issue
Affordable Loan unable to afford their loan or who owe more than the home is worth
Homeowner Equity Refinance ARMs into below-market rate fixed-rate loans for $25 million bond issue
Recovery Opportunity borrowers less than 60 days delinquent
Emergency Mortgage Short-term loans to bring payments up to date; also ongoing Approximately $20 million 
Assistance Program assistance with up to 24 payments annually from loan
repayments and
annual appropriation
SOURCE: Pew Center on the States 2008, based on research by PolicyLab Consulting 
In July 2007, New York State launched the
“Keep the Dream Alive” program. With $100
million available, New York’s Housing Finance
Agency aims to help 500 to 700 families
refinance out of high-risk loans into affordable,
low-interest loans. The program targets
homeowners with interest-only, adjustable-rate
or other unconventional loan terms. Borrowers
must receive homeownership counseling from
approved housing counseling agencies before
loan approval. Critics say the program’s loan
criteria are not broad enough to meet the needs
of most New York City homeowners, but efforts
are underway to expand the program. 
Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan
and Pennsylvania also have announced refinance
programs. 
Prevent “Foreclosure Rescue”
Scams
As foreclosure rates increase, many vulnerable
borrowers may fall victim to scam artists who
promise to rescue them from foreclosure through
various lease-buyback or loan repayment
schemes. These scams typically involve
“foreclosure consultants” who charge clients a fee
to help them avoid foreclosure. The consultants
promise to work with the homeowner’s lender or
servicer, but often do nothing more than what the
borrower could do on his or her own. Equity
property purchasers also make false promises to
help homeowners stay in their homes. They
encourage homeowners to sign their deeds over
to them, and then rent or lease the property back
to the homeowner, often with higher payments
than the original mortgage amount. In many
cases, homeowners do not realize they have
given up ownership of the property. 
At least nine states have enacted legislation
aimed at preventing foreclosure rescue scams
(see Appendix A). While most laws are very new,
with the effects yet to be seen, many consumer
advocates believe they have made it more
difficult for dishonest foreclosure consultants to
operate. Such laws typically include the
following provisions:
• A clear and conspicuous notice stating that
consumers have the right to cancel an
agreement with foreclosure consultants
• Required disclosure of terms and
conditions, as well as a “right to rescind”
period during which a consumer can cancel
the transaction before the closing
• Terms that cap or limit fees that the
foreclosure consultant can charge
consumers, and terms that prohibit
payment until all services are completed
• Terms that rescind or prevent the transfer
of property to a foreclosure consultant 
• Provisions that establish criminal and civil
penalties for violating the regulations
In May 2005, Maryland became one of the first
states to pass emergency legislation to address
foreclosure rescue scams. The Maryland
Protection of Homeowners in Foreclosure Act
seeks to protect homeowners from unscrupulous
organizations portraying themselves as rescue
outfits. The law criminalizes predatory activities
and permits the victim to receive damages if the
consultant knowingly violates its provisions.
Minnesota, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire and New York
all enacted similar legislation between 2004 and
In May 2005,
Maryland became
one of the first
states to pass emergency 
legislation to address 
foreclosure rescue scams. 
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2007. Massachusetts’ regulations allow transfers
of properties in the foreclosure process only
between family members or through nonprofit
organizations to protect consumers from rescue
scams. 
Colorado’s Foreclosure Protection Act prohibits
foreclosure consultants from charging up-front
fees. The law also requires that all agreements
made with a foreclosure consultant be in writing,
in English, and translated into the borrower’s
native language. Under this law, homeowners
have a three-day right of rescission for any
agreement signed with a foreclosure consultant. 
Illinois’ Mortgage Fraud Rescue Act of 2007
requires that any person who seeks to help a
homeowner at risk of foreclosure must fully
disclose in writing the terms of the services, all
associated costs and a right of rescission. Any sale
must be close to the home’s appraised value, and
violators are subject to criminal liability. 
Curb High-Cost Lending
Consumer protection is an important state issue
and several states have been at the forefront of
crafting strong regulations that can safeguard
borrowers—and, ultimately, the lending industry
and the economy as a whole-—from taking on
more expensive loans than they can safely
manage. At least 31 states have passed laws
similar to the federal Home Ownership and
Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), which regulates
very high-cost subprime loans that carry high
rates or fees. After HOEPA was enacted, it
became clear that many abusive lenders
circumvented the law by taking advantage of
loopholes in the definition of which loans it
covered. For this reason, several states enacted
new subprime lending laws to supplement
HOEPA by covering a broader range of fees.
These new provisions result in more loans being
regulated, but they still account for only those
loans in the highest cost portion of the market.
However, some state efforts successfully curbed
the first wave of predatory mortgage lending
(largely centered on equity stripping)39 with
carefully crafted laws designed to weed out
abusive practices. 
North Carolina’s predatory lending law is often
cited as model legislation regulating high-cost
loans; in fact, about a dozen states have
adopted statutes that closely mimic it. The state
uses the same APR triggers as HOEPA but has a
lower fee trigger, requires counseling and bans
prepayment penalties for loans under $150,000.
North Carolina’s law also extends to other types
of mortgages, including purchase loans;
however, it excludes reverse mortgages and
high-cost loans of more than $300,000.
Reform Underwriting Standards
Underwriting standards in the subprime market
have become extremely loose in recent years,
which has been the key driver in today’s
foreclosure crisis. Building on laws passed earlier
this decade, however, states are once again at
the forefront of consumer protection. Congress,
in its deliberations, should carefully examine and
capitalize on what states have learned from
these initiatives. In an effort to re-establish a
stable marketplace for both borrowers and
lenders, several states—including Colorado,
Maine, Minnesota, North Carolina, Ohio and
Massachusetts (by regulation)—have enacted
bold legislation to curtail abusive lending
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practices. The specific provisions vary by state,
but some of the strongest and most effective
practices are discussed here. 
Require Lenders to Assess a Borrower’s 
Ability to Repay 
Several states—such as Colorado, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina, Ohio
and Rhode Island—now require that lenders
assess a borrower’s ability to repay the loan after
introductory interest rates expire. 
• Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North
Carolina, Ohio and Rhode Island all require
lenders to underwrite mortgages at the
fully indexed interest rate to ensure
affordability after adjustment for ARM
loans. The fully indexed rate equals the
index rate prevailing at origination plus the
margin specified in the contract.
• Colorado, Massachusetts, Minnesota and
Ohio require the “ability to repay” analysis
on all home loans while other states require
it only for subprime or other specified loans.
• Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North
Carolina and Ohio all require the “ability to
repay” analysis to include related costs,
such as property taxes and insurance.
Require Lenders to Verify Borrower Income 
To effectively implement an “ability to pay”
standard, lenders must verify that a borrower’s
income is adequate to repay the loan. Borrowers
often do not realize when their income is
overstated on an application, and they may not
understand that they will be charged a higher
interest rate if they fail to document their income
(even if their W-2s are readily available). Stated-
income loans—when borrowers’ incomes are not
verified—have been proven to increase the 
STATES RESPOND: PROTECTING CONSUMERS FROM HIGH-COST LOANSExhibit
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High-cost 
lending regulations 
or laws
 State task force
 States that align
brokers’ interests
with borrowers’
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VT
SOURCE: Pew Center on the States 2008, 
based on research by PolicyLab Consulting
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chance of foreclosure. For example, a review of
a sample of stated-income loans found that 90
percent had inflated incomes, and “more
disturbingly, almost 60 percent of the stated
amounts were exaggerated by more than 50
percent.”40 An increase in loans with few or no
existing documents to verify a borrower’s
income—“low doc” and “no doc” loans—has
compounded the problems of underwriting and
actual affordability. Recent laws in Colorado,
Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North
Carolina and Ohio all require that income
sources be verified. 
Limit or Ban Predatory Prepayment Penalties 
Prepayment penalties—the steep fee (often six
months of interest) for paying off or refinancing a
loan early—are included in about 70 percent of
all subprime loans, compared with about 2
percent of prime loans. Subprime prepayment
penalties trap borrowers in high-cost loans by
subjecting them to the loss of significant home
equity if they refinance. 
• More than 35 states now regulate
prepayment penalties.
• At least 10 states ban most prepayment
penalties outright, including Maine,
Minnesota and North Carolina.
Regulate Mortgage Brokers More Effectively 
Because two thirds of all subprime loan
applications are originated by mortgage brokers,
many states are examining their role and looking
for ways to create greater accountability for
brokers who use unfair and deceptive tactics to
push subprime financing on borrowers. While
many consumers believe mortgage brokers may
have a fiduciary duty to the borrowers they
represent, only Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota
and South Carolina have clear statutes that
outline this legal relationship. Even where legal
duties are undefined, many brokers do act
responsibly and ethically on behalf of borrowers.
Still, the current system provides incentives to
brokers that can be contrary to borrowers’ best
interests. For instance, broker compensation is
driven by yield-spread premiums—the fees paid
to them for originating loans at higher rates than
those for which the borrower would qualify. 
New legislation or regulation also extends to
tightened broker duties. Colorado, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina and
Ohio are all recent examples. These states have
established an obligation of good faith and fair
dealing. And they require brokers to act in the
borrower’s best interests, sell only mortgages
that are appropriate for the particular borrower
and disclose any compensation clearly and
completely. 
Prohibit Lenders from Steering Consumers to
Higher-Cost Loans
Steering is the predatory lending practice of
offering borrowers a higher-cost loan when the
borrower could actually qualify for a better rate
or better terms. Pricing disparities can be the
result of a variety of factors, including
inconsistent application of objective pricing
criteria, targeting of families of color by higher-
rate lenders or brokers and a lack of investment
by lower-cost lenders in these communities. 
For example, recent data illustrate that
communities of color continue to pay more for
homeownership than white borrowers.41 In 2006,
CRL found that for most types of subprime
loans, black and Latino households are 30
percent more likely to be given a subprime loan
even after controlling for legitimate risk factors.42
Lenders and policy makers can take a
multifaceted approach to ensuring that all
borrowers, regardless of race, receive loans that
are fair and sustainable. For instance,
Massachusetts recently instituted regulations
that ban steering, and several other states—
including Minnesota, North Carolina and Ohio—
have addressed steering through anti-predatory
lending laws and broker regulations.
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Enforce Regulations More Strictly 
Most lenders do not keep the loans they make,
but instead sell or “assign” the loan to other
entities that bundle mortgages into securities for
investment purposes. To address this market
dynamic, some states have begun to provide
greater enforcement authority to their mortgage
regulators while also providing a private right of
action for borrowers and establishing assignee
liability, which means that lenders who make
risky loans will be held liable even after selling
the bad loan.
• Ohio has brought many mortgage
protections under its Unfair and Deceptive
Acts or Practices laws, thereby subjecting
lenders to punitive measures for abusive
loans.
• Maine has banned pre-dispute, mandatory
arbitration; the ban ensures that borrowers
can pursue legal claims through the courts.
• Maine and Rhode Island are the most
recent of the dozen or so states to institute
assignee liability for high-cost home loans.
Encourage Consumer Education and
Counseling Before Loans Are Made 
Homeowner counseling programs can help
prevent foreclosures by making consumers
aware of the intricacies of their mortgage
decisions and by educating consumers about
the pitfalls that accompany taking out an
unaffordable mortgage or committing to a
refinance that is not in their best interest. In fact,
successful counseling requirements have been
narrowly focused and have targeted a specific
set of loans.43 However, requiring counseling for
a specific demographic or class of homeowners
can be problematic. 
Illinois provides a useful example. The Illinois
Predatory Lending Database Law went into
effect in January 2006. The law required
mandatory counseling for any mortgage
applicant living within 10 ZIP codes in Cook
County and who had a credit score below a
particular threshold or who had applied for a
loan that had certain characteristics associated
with risky loans. But the law was suspended less
than 10 months later under immense scrutiny
from consumer advocates and lenders, because
it targeted individuals with particular credit
scores who tended to be minorities or low-
income consumers. As a result, the law was
revised to expand its reach to all of Cook County
and to re-focus counseling requirements by the
type of loan, rather than by the credit history of
the borrower. 
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TACKLING THE CRISIS COMPREHENSIVELY
Convene State Task Forces to
Assess Challenges, Bring
Stakeholders Together and 
Identify Needed Reforms
Today, 14 states have created task forces on
foreclosure intervention to marshal resources,
bring stakeholders together and implement a
range of strategies (see Appendix A). Task forces
typically include representatives from nonprofit
agencies, state and local government and, in
many cases, the financial industry. These
alliances help identify state priorities and keep
the issue of foreclosure in the public spotlight.
States’ task forces have focused on all of the
policy reforms discussed in this report: from
seeking to protect homeowners before they
secure mortgage loans to offering short-term
loans and mortgage refinancing to help
homeowners stave off foreclosure.
The Massachusetts Mortgage Summit Working
Groups, a state task force, works to implement
strategies to address the foreclosure crisis.
Convened by the state Division of Banks, a
summit consisting of representatives from
nonprofits, government and the mortgage
lending industry was held in November 2006
and produced two working groups that focused
on rules and enforcement and consumer
education and foreclosure assistance. In April
2007, the groups issued a report titled,
Recommended Solutions to Prevent
Foreclosures and Ensure Massachusetts
Consumers Maintain the Dream of
Homeownership. (Exhibit 6 illustrates this group’s
primary findings.) In June 2007, Governor Deval
Patrick submitted a legislative proposal (H.B.
4085) that drew upon the Mortgage Summit
Groups’ recommendations. His proposal
criminalized mortgage fraud; created an
information system to monitor and analyze
foreclosures; required consumers applying for a
nonconforming variable rate mortgage to get
counseling before obtaining the loan; and
mandated that mortgage servicers file a 90-day
notice of intent to foreclose with the homeowner
and the Division of Banks. As of December
2007, the bill was still under consideration;
however, the state’s banking commissioner has
already secured temporary stays for hundreds of
homeowners in the foreclosure process, and has
provided financing and counseling assistance to
these families. In addition, the governor
announced a $250 million loan refinance
program in July 2007; the attorney general has
banned foreclosure rescue schemes; and the
state senate passed an omnibus foreclosure
relief measure.
Convened in March 2007 by Ohio’s Governor
Ted Strickland and chaired by the director of the
state’s Department of Commerce, the Ohio
Foreclosure Prevention Task Force is made up of
25 members from government, industry and the
nonprofit sector. The task force has approved 27
recommendations in the following areas: 
• Development of public awareness
campaigns 
• Funding goals for counseling, including at
least $2 million in new state funds 
• More flexibility within pooling and servicing
agreements 
• Improvements to Ohio’s foreclosure
processes, including expanding consumer
access to counseling and legal assistance,
encouraging mediation and alternative
dispute resolution in foreclosure
proceedings and expediting property
transfers to the court or sheriff to minimize
impact on surrounding neighborhoods
• Stronger protections for homeowners,
requiring mortgage servicers to contact the
state with details on the loan terms and
history of the consumer before filing a
foreclosure complaint
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• Lender requirements that offer consumers
the option of escrowing taxes and
insurance
• Strategies for dealing with the aftermath of
increased numbers of foreclosed homes,
including reallocating resources to facilitate
reinvestment in affected neighborhoods
and to fund additional public foreclosure
rescue measures for consumers
As a result of the recommendations outlined by
the Ohio Foreclosure Prevention Task Force last
September, Governor Strickland has sought the
cooperation of mortgage lenders to address the
increasing number of foreclosures in Ohio. The
governor proposed a compact, which called for
servicers to increase outreach and education to
borrowers, especially in the areas of loan
modifications and rate changes. Under the
compact, the servicers were asked to take all
measures to increase loan workouts, including
adjusting their staff and resources to
accommodate major improvements in
preventative efforts and loss mitigation. If these
efforts to modify loans should fail, lenders were
required to provide adequate advance
notification of the intent to proceed with
foreclosure.
In early April 2008, Governor Strickland reached
agreement with nine of 11 of Ohio's largest
mortgage servicers on a significant effort to
modify the terms of adjustable-rate mortgages
across the state. 
In addition to attempting to work with the state’s
major lenders to provide distressed homeowners
relief, Governor Strickland directed the Ohio
Department of Development (ODOD) to
coordinate the distribution of $2 million from the
Ohio Housing Trust Fund for housing counseling
services. The Trust Fund will be asked to provide
an additional $1 million to ODOD for a vacant
housing demonstration program. Ohio also has
an active loan fund (the Opportunity Loan
Refinance Fund) to help households in danger of
foreclosure to refinance problematic loans.
Similarly, the New York State Banking
Department launched the Halt Abusive Lending
Transactions and Mortgage Fraud Campaign
(HALT) in reaction to the state’s growing number
of foreclosures resulting from predatory lending.
This interagency task force aims to counteract
the harm caused by predatory lending through
increased collaboration between lenders,
communities and other stakeholders while
working to strengthen community and local
organizations’ ability to combat predatory
lending. HALT provides outreach and consumer
counseling through public service
announcements, a consumer helpline and grants
that support consumer services, and partners
with the State of New York Mortgage Agency to
offer a 40-year fixed rate loan and to develop
the “Keep the Dream” program that helps
eligible subprime borrowers refinance their
loans. The program also raises mortgage lending
standards through better documentation of a
borrower’s capacity to pay loans, a unified
systematic approach to loan modifications and
the creation of a mortgage fraud unit and a
national licensing system for mortgage loan
originators.44
Advocates in Colorado successfully pulled
together various stakeholders in the public and
private sectors, including representatives from
the Colorado Division of Housing, JP Morgan
Chase and the Colorado Association of Realtors,
to form the Colorado Foreclosure Prevention
Task Force.45 This group’s central achievement to
date has been establishing a Colorado
foreclosure hotline, which fields calls from state
residents having trouble making their mortgage
payments. 
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Exhibit
6
MASSACHUSETTS TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, 2007
1. Criminalize Mortgage Fraud
Goal: Mortgage fraud becomes a criminal offense
with a penalty of up to 10 years imprisonment and/or
a $50,000 fine. Multiple cases of fraud could receive
up to 20 years imprisonment and fines up to
$500,000.
Status: Requires legislation or emergency regulation
by the Office of the Attorney General. 
2. Increase Mortgage Licensing Requirements
Goal: Support National Mortgage Licensing System
(NMLS) and expand licensing requirements to include
all mortgage originators, increase capitalization and
net worth requirements for brokers and lenders and
require minimum licensing requirements of five years
for lenders and three years for brokers.
Status: Division of Banks proposed regulations for
minimum experience requirements for brokers and
lenders as well as increased net worth requirements
and a surety bond for lenders and brokers.
3. Increase Funding for the Division of Banks
Goal: Increase funding for Division of Banks
enforcement activities by increasing mortgage lender
and broker fees. 
Status: Governor proposed legislation to provide the
Division of Banks funding for enforcement, which is
under consideration.
4. Adopt Federal Guidance on 
Nontraditional Mortgages
Goal: Adopt parallel guidance that can be applied to
lenders that are not federally regulated. 
Status: Division of Banks adopted parallel guidance in
January 2007 for nontraditional mortgages such as
those with interest-only and payment option ARMs. 
5. Change Foreclosure Laws
Goal: Improve rights of consumers in the foreclosure
process. 
Status: Governor supported legislation to require pre-
foreclosure notification to homeowners and the
Division of Banks and post-foreclosure reporting of
costs and proceeds of the home sale. 
6. Create Foreclosure Database
Goal: Division of Banks to develop a database to
track information on pre-foreclosure notification
and foreclosure petitions. 
Status: Legislation introduced to require that the
name and license number of lender and broker be
recorded on all mortgages when filed with the
registry of deeds. 
7. Prevent Foreclosure Rescue Scams
Goal: Require that transactions with foreclosure
consultants be in writing with no payment due until
all services rendered. Provide a five-day grace
period that enables consumers to cancel the
contract. 
Status: The attorney general introduced emergency
regulations prohibiting unfair and deceptive
foreclosure rescue scams to prevent the transfer of
distressed property to for-profit entities charging a
fee. Transfers between family members or involved
nonprofit organizations are exempt.
8. Increase Consumer Awareness about
Foreclosure and Increase Resources
Goal: Support of statewide and grassroots
awareness campaign in multiple languages;
increase availability of homeownership counseling
and borrower workshops by nonprofit agencies. 
Status: The state is developing a partnership with
the Homeownership Preservation Foundation to
offer counseling.
9. Create Foreclosure Intervention Products
Goal: Create a mortgage product to help
consumers refinance unsustainable loans and
provide credit enhancements for high-risk
mortgages. Seek participation of private lenders. 
Status: MassHousing, the state’s housing finance
agency, established a $250 million Loan Refinance
Program offering fixed-rate refinance loans.
Address Foreclosure Vacancies,
Turnover and Blight
Even if a state adopts a wide range of reforms
and approaches the crisis comprehensively, the
reality is that many homes with unsustainable
subprime mortgages will fall victim to
foreclosure. While there is still a window of
opportunity for state policy makers to mitigate
the effects of foreclosure by carrying out some
of the measures highlighted in this report, state
and local officials need to consider strategies to
directly manage the consequences of foreclosure
in modest-income homeowner neighborhoods.
Foreclosed homes are frequently abandoned and
left to vandals, disrepair and mismanagement for
up to two years while banks work through the
foreclosure process. While many localities have
programs in place to manage troubled
properties, these efforts were designed to deal
with existing vacant properties, not to handle a
rapidly rising tide of new, vacant homes in
otherwise stable neighborhoods. With a large
volume of properties entering foreclosure, efforts
to manage vacant properties will become even
more challenging. And these efforts will become
increasingly important for neighborhood
preservation and revitalization. According to our
analysis of CRL’s subprime spillover data,
surrounding homeowners could lose $356 billion
cumulatively, simply by being in close proximity
to foreclosed properties.46 As a result, cities
across the country could lose many billions in
taxes and revenue from lost fees for services
(for example, permits, water, garbage pick-
up) provided by the public sector.
Both Massachusetts and Minnesota recently
announced programs to address vacancies in
the wake of the foreclosure crisis. The Ohio
Foreclosure Prevention Task Force has
recommended strategies to manage the
aftermath of foreclosures. These state
strategies and efforts emerging in other
states generally include: 
• Expediting property transfers once a
foreclosure judgment is completed, which
entails getting the property into the hands
of the new owner as quickly as possible.
Ohio uses a system in which specially
appointed master commissioners
administer the post-judgment process from
entry of judgment to transfer of title. Ohio
also is considering a two-track system that
would move investor properties through
foreclosure more quickly than owner-
occupied properties, giving homeowners
greater opportunity to remedy their
situation.
• Providing grants for property rehabilitation.
The cost of deferred maintenance and
major repairs for homes in foreclosure can
be significant. In some cases homes simply
need to be demolished. Illinois and
Minnesota have developed modest
programs to recover properties that are
lender real estate owned (REO)—homes
that lenders have taken possession of and
need to sell off—and turn them over to
local community development
organizations to renovate for first-time
home buyers. While the number of
recovered properties remains low, the
renovated homes can have a significant
impact by stabilizing neighborhoods that
have experienced a wave of foreclosures.
Foreclosed homes
are frequently
abandoned and
left to vandals, disrepair and
mismanagement for up to two
years while banks work through
the foreclosure process.
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• Providing support for municipal code
enforcement to ensure abandoned
properties are maintained and to make
sure they do not create blight for
neighboring properties; engaging in land
banking to publically purchase, hold and
maintain abandoned property for later
public use; and supporting neighborhood
planning and redevelopment efforts. Ohio
has explored using tax foreclosures to
secure properties or propel rehabilitation.
State housing finance agencies can also
use Low Income Housing Tax Credits to
redevelop vacant properties.
Because REO properties are a depreciating
asset, lenders are increasingly willing to sell
them in bulk at a significant discount or even
donate some properties to a public entity or
nonprofit development agency. This
arrangement can require significant capital
resources, extensive negotiation and carefully
managed housing construction activities.
Combined with the scattered-site nature of
single-family homes in foreclosure and the poor
quality and location of the most depreciated
REOs, taking on a portfolio of properties should
be approached with great caution.
A related issue for homes in foreclosure affects
those properties that contain one or more rental
units. What happens to existing tenants? Paying
renters provide some cash flow for maintenance,
taxes and other expenses. But many potential
new owners prefer an empty property in which
they can invest and then lease to new tenants.
There are few protections for renters living in a
property in foreclosure, and many are evicted on
short notice. Although few states have
protections for renters, some have started to
explore additional safeguards to provide
extended availability of housing for renters in
these situations—although many of these
proposed fixes are temporary in nature. Lease-
holding tenants in New Jersey, New Hampshire,
Washington, D.C. and Massachusetts cannot be
evicted by new owners unless the tenants have
failed to pay the rent or have violated any other
important lease term or law. In August 2007,
North Carolina enacted a law increasing to 30
days the court notice given to tenants in
properties containing 15 or more rental units.
Illinois recently passed a law extending the
notice period for tenants in foreclosed buildings
to 120 days or the remainder of the lease,
whichever is shorter.47
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Congress has taken some steps and is actively
considering others to address the current
foreclosure crisis. The following federal initiatives
are meant to complement states’ actions and, if
successful, they could significantly reduce the
impact of subprime foreclosures nationwide. 
FHASecure
Launched in August 2007, this program is aimed
at helping homeowners refinance certain ARMs.
Unlike traditional FHA-insured mortgages, the
program allows even delinquent borrowers to
refinance if their delinquency results from an
ARM resetting to a higher rate. This program
applies only to owner-occupied homes (no
investors) with existing non-FHA ARM loans that
have or will reset between June 2005 and
December 2009. The program is available to
homeowners with mortgages under a certain
dollar amount, which varies by geographic
region (for instance, the temporary limit is
729,750 for high cost areas.)48
HOPE NOW Alliance 
As described earlier, the federal HOPE NOW
alliance represents 11 lenders servicing more
than four out of five subprime loans.49
A significant part of the HOPE NOW effort is
aimed at modifying loans by freezing the interest
rate at the current level. The plan was announced
in December 2007, and is a voluntary effort by
the private sector to address the national
foreclosure challenge. However, this program
only targets a limited number of homeowners
facing foreclosure. To be eligible, homeowners
must have had good payment histories, taken
their loans out between January 2005 and July
2006, face loan resets that result in a payment
increase of 10 percent or more, and had a loan
to value ratio of over 97 percent. The program
uses a direct mail campaign to contact at-risk
homeowners and encourage them to call the
Homeownership Preservation Foundation’s
national hotline (888-995-HOPE). In November
2007, the alliance sent more than 200,000 letters
to at-risk homeowners.50
Because HOPE NOW is entirely voluntary, it will
have an impact only to the extent that lenders
and servicers agree to modify loans. This plan
does not address or alleviate any of the problems
that have prevented lenders and servicers from
modifying loans to date (for example, the
interplay between first and second lien holders
and the mismatched incentives between servicers
and investors). The plan excludes borrowers who
have already defaulted on their loans and are
already on track to lose their homes in
foreclosure. The plan also excludes all borrowers
whose rates reset before January 1, 2008, which
accounts for most borrowers with loans that
originated prior to 2006. An even more recent
Treasury plan, “Project Lifeline,” provides a
“pause” that would temporarily halt foreclosure
proceedings for some borrowers, but only for 30
days.
In mid-January 2008, the MBA released statistics
on the number of loan modifications its
members accomplished in the third quarter of
2007. The data reveal that the number of
initiated foreclosures outstripped loan
modifications by a seven-to-one margin (384,388
to 53,573). For subprime ARMs—the root of the
current foreclosure crisis—servicers modified
National Initiatives
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almost 13,000 loans
nationwide, initiating
foreclosures 13 times more
often (166,415 to 12,741). A
day after the MBA’s
numbers were released,
HOPE NOW reported,
based on separate data,
that there were 120,000
loan modifications in the
second half of 2007. The
absence of detailed
information leads to
questions of whether the
modifications implemented
are sustainable. In any case,
the available evidence
suggests that the rate of
voluntary loan modifications
is well outpaced by the
wave of foreclosures. In fact,
the number of foreclosure
starts reported by the MBA
in the third quarter
outnumbered the number
of loan modifications
reported by HOPE NOW for
the third and fourth quarters
combined, by a margin of
three to one.51
National Mortgage
Licensing System 
All states have implemented
licensing requirements and
standards for individual loan
originators that include
education requirements,
testing and criminal
background checks.
Beginning in early 2008,
state-licensed lenders,
brokers and loan officers in
seven states will be able to
Court-Supervised Loan Modifications: Current
Law Excludes Bankrupt Homeowners from Relief
The risk of foreclosure is highest for several million families who hold subprime
loans with “exploding” adjustable interest rates that are set to rise sharply,
resulting in massive and often unaffordable payment increases. If these
homeowners are unable to make their payments, refinance the mortgage or sell
their home, current law gives them only limited options: loan modification by
lenders or foreclosure.
Given that lenders currently are not voluntarily modifying loans in significant
numbers, one of the potential options for homeowners who would otherwise
lose their homes would be a loan modification through the bankruptcy process.
But that avenue is legally closed to them, because current federal law specifies
that the mortgage on the primary residence is the only debt that bankruptcy
courts cannot modify. However, such bankruptcy relief is available on other types
of debts, including loans on commercial real estate, investment properties and
even yachts. Congress provided a similar type of bankruptcy relief to family
farmers during the farm crisis of the 1980s, and this remains part of the
bankruptcy code today.
CRL estimates that changing the federal bankruptcy law to allow court-ordered
loan modifications for homeowners in bankruptcy could prevent 600,000
foreclosures. (For more information, see http://www.responsiblelending.org/
issues/mortgage/solutions/hr-3609-compromise-bill-permitting-court-supervised-
loan-modifications-would-save-600-000-homes.html.) Both the U.S. House of
Representatives and a key U.S. Senate committee are considering bankruptcy
reform to help homeowners. Current proposals include the following provisions:
• Modifications that incur no cost to the U.S. Treasury
• Relief efforts that narrowly target families who would otherwise lose
their homes, excluding families who do not need assistance
• Programs that help maintain property values for families who live near
homes at risk of foreclosure
• Efforts that save American families not facing foreclosure $72.5 billion
by averting neighboring foreclosures
• Guarantees for lenders that they will obtain at least the value they
would through foreclosure (given that a foreclosure sale can recover
only the market value of the home) 
• Expedited processes that save lenders the high cost and significant
delays of foreclosures
While homeowners generally turn to the drastic solution of bankruptcy only as a
last resort, the proposed bankruptcy reform would potentially cover a significant
number of homeowners, especially those who will not qualify for FHASecure and
HOPE NOW programs.
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use the Web-based National Mortgage Licensing
System (NMLS), administered by the Conference
of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) and the
American Association of Residential Mortgage
Regulators, to apply for, update and renew their
licenses online.
While NMLS does not cover banks that are
chartered by federal or state governments, CSBS
estimates that the online database will help
ensure accountability because it will cover
approximately 70 percent of all loan originators.
MEASURING OUTCOMES
All of the programs and proposed plans
discussed in this report will amount to very little
without follow through on all levels, so
measuring the results of these efforts is essential.
Without such information, it is impossible to
measure lenders’ results against their proposed
plans. 
Foreclosure filings are public records, typically
maintained by county governments. Gaining
access to these data can be difficult, however,
unless the filings are recorded in an electronic
format and released for analysis. In many
communities, vendors have developed
foreclosure filing databases with the intent to sell
the information to real estate speculators. These
data vendors frequently receive media attention,
but the quality of their data can be
questionable. State policy makers could certainly
use these and other data sources, after
verification, to monitor foreclosure trends in key
markets. 
The lack of regularly reported data has been a
significant concern to critics of the HOPE NOW
loan modification plan. The plan encourages
What to Measure
ACCOUNTABILITY MEASURES AND 
DATA TO BE COLLECTED
For hotline and counseling efforts:
• How borrowers heard about service
• Main reason for delinquency
• Loan amount
• Income
• Number of payments behind
• Type of loan (ARM, interest only)
• Lender/servicer name
• Date of foreclosure filing
• Cumulative length of counseling
• Property address
For loan programs:
• Number of loans
• Amount of loans
• Type of loans and type of previous loans
refinanced
• Loan repayment rates
For prosecution of fraud:
• Type of fraud
• Dollar value lost or at risk
• Referrals to other services
For vacant property reclamation:
• Number of properties
• Appraised values
• Repair and/or rehabilitation investment
• Resale value
• Demographics of new occupants
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loan servicers to report extensive data on the
number and types of loan modifications, but
these reports are required to go to investors in
mortgage-backed securities only—not to
regulators, policy makers or the general public.52
Two national efforts are underway to collect
consistent data on loan servicing activity,
although both of these rely on voluntary
compliance by servicers. First, a working group
of the Conference of State Banking Supervisors
and State Attorneys General (CSBS/AG) has
developed a framework for collecting state-level
data on loan servicing activities and outcomes.
In addition, the national HOPE NOW alliance
has been developing metrics for measuring the
activities of servicers. However, both the
CSBS/AG and HOPE NOW data collection
efforts are likely to release data in an aggregate
form, rather than providing lender- and
geography-specific information. 
At least two states have introduced bills to make
data reporting mandatory. California is
considering legislation that would require all
servicers to report data on a monthly basis for all
subprime and nontraditional mortgages. This
lender-specific data would then be posted on
government agency Web sites. Maryland has
introduced a similar proposal.
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For more information and help in designing
state responses to the foreclosure crisis, policy
makers can refer to the following resources. (This
list is not comprehensive.) 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
oversees state-chartered banks and trust
companies that belong to the Federal Reserve
System. The Board provides educational
information and offers a list of resources and
referral agencies to help consumers avoid
foreclosure and to assist borrowers who have
already entered the foreclosure process.
www.federalreserveeducation.org/pfed/
foreclosure/
Center for Responsible Lending
The Center for Responsible Lending (CRL) is a
unit of the Center for Community Self-Help (Self-
Help), based in Durham, N.C. Recognizing that
lack of legal representation is an obstacle for
families facing foreclosure, CRL created the
Institute for Foreclosure Legal Assistance (IFLA),
a project managed by the National Association
of Consumer Advocates, which funds
organizations that provide legal representation
to families facing foreclosure due to subprime
lending.53 www.responsiblelending.org/ifla.html
Federal Housing Administration
The Federal Housing Administration, a subsection
of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development that monitors lenders and provides
mortgage insurance, offers consumer education
and resources on its Web site for individuals and
families in danger of losing their homes.
http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page?_pageid=33,717
348&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL
Homeowners’ Emergency Mortgage
Assistance Program (HEMAP)
One of the first of its kind, HEMAP provides
eligible Pennsylvania residents who are facing
foreclosure with assistance through its loan fund.
www.phfa.org
Homeownership Preservation Foundation
The Homeownership Preservation Foundation
(HPF) creates partnerships with local
governments, nonprofit organizations, borrowers
and lenders to help families overcome obstacles
that could result in the loss of their homes. HPF
offers 1-888-995-HOPE, a national homeowner
assistance hotline to help individuals and
families who are struggling financially to avoid
foreclosure. www.995hope.org
Minnesota: Foreclosure Prevention Assistance
Program
Minnesota’s Housing Finance Agency, partnering
with 18 nonprofit counseling agencies, has
created the Foreclosure Prevention Assistance
Program to provide counseling and some
financial assistance to homeowners in danger of
foreclosure. www.mnhousing.gov/partners/
lenders/programs/MHFA_001511.aspx
National Consumer Law Center
The National Consumer Law Center (NCLC)
helps consumers, their advocates and policy
makers to use powerful consumer laws to build
financial security and promote marketplace
justice for vulnerable individuals and families.
NCLC presents information about mortgage
servicing and foreclosure prevention, offering a
book and CD-ROM about foreclosure
prevention. www.consumerlaw.org
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NeighborWorks® America
NeighborWorks America, a national nonprofit
organization that works to revitalize communities
through affordable housing opportunities, training
and technical assistance, has created the Center
for Foreclosure Solutions, which works to reduce
the rate of foreclosures as well as the negative
impact of foreclosures on borrowers and
communities. The Center convenes stakeholders
and supports a coordinated foreclosure
prevention and intervention strategy in
communities nationwide. The Center provides
tips for avoiding foreclosure, background
information, counseling training courses and a
database of other resources. In FY2008, Congress
charged NeighborWorks America with
administering a $180 million national foreclosure
mitigation counseling program. www.nw.org
New York: “Keep the Dream Alive” Program
The State of New York Mortgage Agency’s “Keep
the Dream Alive” program works to refinance
high-risk loans into 30- or 40-year, fixed-rate loans.
The program has $100 million available and aims
to help between 500 and 700 families refinance
their loans in danger of foreclosure.
www.nyhomes.org/home/index.asp?page=489
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC), a bureau of the U.S. Department of the
Treasury, regulates all national banks. In June
2007, OCC released Insights: Foreclosure
Prevention; Improving Contact with Borrowers, a
document that introduces how banks, in
conjunction with state and local governments,
nonprofits and other key players, are
approaching the issue of foreclosure and
working to safeguard homeowners and their
communities.
www.occ.treas.gov/cdd/Foreclosure_Prevention_
Insights.pdf
Ohio: Opportunity Loan Refinance Program
Ohio’s Opportunity Loan Refinance Program,
launched by the Ohio Housing Finance Agency
(OHFA), aims to help borrowers refinance high-
cost loans, offering a 30-year, fixed-rate loan and
a 20-year, fixed-rate second mortgage. A unique
aspect of this program is that the loans
purchased by OHFA are bought through taxable
bonds at no cost to the state’s taxpayers.
www.ohiohome.org/refinance/default.htm
The Reinvestment Fund
The Reinvestment Fund (TRF) is a national leader
in the financing of neighborhood revitalization,
with efforts focused across the Mid-Atlantic
region. TRF’s recent work includes studies on
foreclosure filings in Delaware and Pennsylvania.
www.trfund.org
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Broker Must
Consider/Represent 
Interest of Borrowers Statewide Statewide
when Recommending Consumer Consumer Statewide
Mortgages (all states Education Education Foreclosure
State High-Cost Loan Law/Regulation Foreclosure Intervention Law/Regulation license mortgage brokers) Campaign Hotline Task Force
Alabama
Alaska 2005
Arizona 2002 l 2007
Arkansas 2002 Arkansas Home Loan Protection l
Act 1340 (high-cost loan regulations)
California 2002 California Covered Loan Law 4970 2007 Department of Corporations 2007
(high-cost loans, disclosure, counseling Release No. 61-FS (notice to loan 
recommended, lower threshold than servicers)
HOEPA, referral to counseling hotline)
Colorado 2002 Colorado Consumer Equity 2007 HB 1322 l 2006 2006
Protection Act (high-cost loans, disclosure) (Mortgage Fraud Prevention Act)
Connecticut 2001 HB 6131; 2002 HB 5073 CT Families – Refinancing Assistance 2005 l 2007
Connecticut Abusive Home Loan 
Lending Practices Act (high-cost loans)
Delaware 2006 Emergency Mortgage Assistance 2001 l
Program (DEMAP)
District of 2002 Home Loan Protection Act Title
Columbia 26A Ch 20 (high-cost loans, disclosures, 
counseling recommended)
Florida 2002 Florida Fair Lending Act SB 2262 2007 l
(high-cost loans, disclosure, counseling 
recommended)
Georgia 2002 Georgia Fair Lending Act HB 1361 
(high-cost loans, counseling required, 
lower trigger than HOEPA)
Hawaii 2007 HB 1306 HB 1336 (mortgage fraud
against seniors)
Idaho
Illinois 2003 815 ILCS 137 High Risk Home Loan 2007 Mortgage Rescue Fraud Act 2004 l 2006
Act (high-cost loans, disclosure, 
counseling recommended, lower 
threshold than HOEPA)
Indiana 2005 Home Loan Practices ("Article 9") 2007 SB 0390 Mortgage Rescue Fraud 2006 l 2006
(high-cost loans, disclosure, counseling Law 2007 HB 1753 (counseling) 
recommended)
Iowa 2007 l
Kansas 2000 Regulation of Agreements and 
Practices (16a-3-207) (high LTV loans, 
mentions counseling is available)
Kentucky 2003 High-Cost Home Loan Law (high- 2005
cost loans, counseling recommended, 
disclosure) 2006 Predatory Lending Law
Louisiana
Maine 2003 PL49 (high-cost loans, disclosure); l
2007 Predatory Lending Law (counseling 
required)
Maryland 2002 Maryland Covered Loan Law 2005 Foreclosure Counseling Services Law 2005 l 2007
(high-cost loans, disclosure, counseling (mandates borrowers in foreclosure be 
recommended at application, lower referred to counseling); 2006 Lifeline 
threshold than HOEPA) Refinance Mortgage Program; 2007
Homeowners Preserving Equity (HOPE)
Massachusetts 2004 Predatory Home Loan Practices Act 2007 Home Saver Foreclosure Prevention l 2005 l 2006
(high-cost loans, counseling required; Program (foreclosure prevention loan 
lower triggers than HOEPA) fund)
Michigan 2002 Consumer Mortgage Protection Act 2007 Adjustable-Rate Mortgage Program 2006 2006
(disclosure, counseling recommended at and Rescue Refinance Program
application, referred to counseling hotline)
Minnesota 2002 Residential Mortgage Originator 2007 Foreclosure Prevention Loan Fund l 2003 l 2007
and Servicer Licensing Act (disclosure); (funding for expanding counseling)
2007 Predatory Mortgage Practices 
(high-cost loan regulations)
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Broker Must
Consider/Represent 
Interest of Borrowers Statewide Statewide
when Recommending Consumer Consumer Statewide
Mortgages (all states Education Education Foreclosure
State High-Cost Loan Law/Regulation Foreclosure Intervention Law/Regulation license mortgage brokers) Campaign Hotline Task Force
Mississippi 2006
Missouri 2007 Foreclosure Rescue Fraud
Montana 2007 l
Nebraska
Nevada 2007 Predatory Lending Law (high-cost 2007 Predatory Lending Law (rescue fraud proposed
loan regulations) prevention) 2007
New 2007 Foreclosure Consultant Practices Act 
Hampshire (rescue fraud prevention)
New Jersey 2002 New Jersey Home Ownership 2007 New Jersey Home Ownership 
Security Act (high-cost loans, disclosure, Preservation Refinance Program
counseling required)
New Mexico 2003 Home Loan Protection Act (high-cost 2004 l 2007
loans, lower threshold than HOEPA,
disclosure, counseling recommended)
New York 2000 High-Cost Home Loan Law (lower 2007 Home Equity Theft Prevention Act 2007 2007
threshold than HOEPA, disclosure, (rescue fraud); 2007 Keep the Dream 
counseling recommended) (revised 2007) refinance fund; 2007 HALT 
North Carolina 1999 High-Cost Home Loan Law (high-cost 2007 HB 1374 (consumer protections in l 2001
loan regulations, counseling required) loan servicing)
North Dakota
Ohio 2002 HB 386 Sec. 1349.26 (high-cost loan 2007 Opportunity Loan Refinance l 2005 l 2007
regulations, disclosure); 2006 Homebuyer Program
Protection Act
Oklahoma 2003 Home Ownership and Equity 2006
Protection Act (high-cost loan regulations, 
counseling recommended)
Oregon
Pennsylvania 2001 Consumer Equity Protection Act 2007 Refinance to an Affordable Loan
(high-cost loans, counseling (REAL); Homeowner Equity Recovery 
recommended, disclosures) Opportunity (HERO)
Rhode Island 2006 Home Loan Protection Act (high-cost 2006 Madeline Walker Act (rescue fraud 2002
loan regulations, disclosure, counseling prevention)
required, lower threshold than HOEPA)
South Carolina 2003 High-Cost and Consumer Home l 2002
Loans Act (high-cost loan regulations, 
counseling required)
South Dakota
Tennessee 2006 Home Loan Protection Act (high-cost 
loan regulations, counseling 
recommended, disclosure)
Texas 2002 High-Cost Home Loan Law (high-
cost loan regulations, counseling recom-
mended, referral to counseling hotline)
Utah 2004 High-Cost Home Loan Act (high-cost
loan regulations, disclosure, 
counseling recommended)
Vermont l
Virginia 2007
Washington
West Virginia 2004 West Virginia Residential Mortgage 
Lender, Broker and Servicer Act (limits 
fees, requires counseling, strong provisions 
cover all loan types, protection against 
excessive fees and points, prepayment 
penalties, yield-spread premiums, includes 
remedies for violations)
Wisconsin 2004 Responsible High-Cost Mortgage 2007
Lending Law (high-cost loan regulations, 
counseling recommended)
Wyoming
SOURCE: Pew Center on the States, 2008, based on research by PolicyLab Consulting
NOTE: As of January 31, 2008
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Subprime Lending: Sowing the
Seeds of a Foreclosure Crisis
The subprime market was intended to provide
home loans for people with impaired or limited
credit histories. In addition to lower incomes and
blemished credit, borrowers who received
subprime loans may have had unstable income,
savings or employment and a high level of debt
relative to their income. However, there is
evidence that many families who received
subprime mortgages could have qualified for
less expensive mainstream loans but were
instead “steered” into accepting higher-cost
subprime loans. In fact, one study of Freddie
Mac that securitized loans found that one in five
subprime loan holders could have received a
prime mortgage.54
In a short time, subprime mortgages grew from
a small niche market to a major component of
home financing. From 1994 through 2006, the
subprime home loan market grew from $35
billion to more than $600 billion and reached a
23 percent share of the mortgage market.55 The
majority of subprime lending has been in the
form of refinance loans rather than purchase
mortgages to buy homes. Subprime loans also
typically have higher interest rates and fees than
found in prime loans, and subprime loans are
more likely to include prepayment penalties and
broker fees (known as “yield-spread premiums”).
During the late 1990s, widespread abusive
lending practices emerged in the subprime
market. The primary abusive practices involved
equity stripping—that is, charging homeowners
exorbitant fees or selling borrowers such
unnecessary products as single-premium credit
insurance on refinanced mortgages. By financing
these additional charges as part of the new loan,
unscrupulous lenders were able to disguise
these excessive costs. Further, these loans
typically came with costly prepayment penalties,
which mean that homeowners have to pay
thousands of dollars to close the abusive loan.
During the past several years, a number of states
moved to pass laws that address equity-stripping
practices. Research assessing these laws has
shown them to be highly successful in cutting
excessive costs for consumers without hindering
borrowers’ access to credit. In addition, the
leadership shown by states helped encourage
the adoption of some best practices by
responsible lenders and leaders in the mortgage
industry. For example, single-premium credit
insurance virtually disappeared from the market,
upfront fees declined and prepayment penalties
became less costly, on average, and lasted for a
shorter period of time. 
In spite of these successes, problems in subprime
lending were not completely eliminated.
Prepayment penalties continued to be imposed
on 70 percent of all subprime loans, and many
other predatory practices stayed in place and still
occur in the market. These practices include
steering (which occurs when lenders push market
borrowers into a subprime mortgage even when
they could qualify for a prime loan), yield-spread
premiums (fees to brokers for selling loans with
higher interest rates than the borrowers qualified
for), and loan “flipping” (which occurs when a
lender refinances a loan without providing any
net tangible benefit to the homeowner). 
In addition, a second generation of subprime
lending abuses emerged in 2004 and dominated
the market in 2005 and 2006. These predatory
practices included high-risk loan products that
typically began with a low introductory “teaser”
interest rate that increased sharply after two
years and failed to account for escrows for
required taxes and insurance. The very design of
these loans, which were marketed to borrowers
who could not afford these mortgages, has
forced struggling homeowners to refinance to
avoid unmanageable payments, in effect
defeating the prohibition against flipping that
many states instituted previously. 
Add to this mix a historically strong housing
market from 2002 to 2006, where prices in many
areas exceeded sustainable levels. Record
volumes of loans were pushed through the
mortgage lending system, with real estate
markets promoting homes as an investment with
rapid double-digit returns. Exacerbating these
conditions were subprime loans combined with
adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), loans with
teaser rates and even negative repayment of
principal, loan applications with no
documentation of ability to repay, and overly
aggressive real estate appraisers and loan
brokers. 
Borrowers were routinely told that if all else
failed they could simply refinance their loans.
But when home prices stopped rising at record
rates, many borrowers found they owed more
than their homes were worth. 
Although media attention has focused on
current borrowers with adjustable-rate loans that
will reset to higher rates after an introductory
period (creating so-called payment shocks and
likely more foreclosures), the bulk of these resets
are predicted to occur in 2008 and 2009. The
problems of the mortgage market are just
beginning; it could take up to five years for the
process to unwind and recover. 
As Exhibit B-1 shows, a large share of these
subprime rate resets will occur throughout 2008,
peaking in October. Massive foreclosures are
also expected to arise from the large numbers of
another product, the payment option ARMs,
which are also facing
significant payment resets.
Studies have shown that,
particularly as originators
who lacked experience in
making these loans
entered the fray in a
significant way, many of
these payment option
ARMs were originated
with lax underwriting
standards—even though
the majority of them are
not subprime loans.56
Exhibit B-1 shows a spike
in payment option ARM
resets between 2009 and
2011, just after the 2008
spike in subprime hybrid
ARM resets.
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MONTHLY MORTGAGE RATE RESETS 
(first reset in billions of U.S. dollars)Exhibit
B-1
SOURCE: Credit Suisse Fixed Income U.S. Mortgage Strategy, January 2007
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Understanding the Foreclosure
Process
When a consumer acquires a mortgage loan on
a home, the lender receives a security interest in
the property. This allows the lender to start
foreclosure proceedings if the borrower fails to
pay the loan according to its stated terms. While
a borrower is technically in “default” on the loan
after missing even one payment, the reality is
that many lenders wait until the loan is seriously
past due (three missed payments—also called a
“90-day delinquency”—with a fourth payment
due) before declaring the loan in default and
beginning the foreclosure process.
The foreclosure process varies according to state
law, but typically lasts five to 18 months. Initially,
borrowers have a period of time (called the
reinstatement period) during which they have
the right to “cure” their default. The
reinstatement period typically lasts three to four
months, although it can be as short as 21 days,
as in Texas, or as long as six to 12 months. 
Borrowers may cure a default in several ways: 
• They may bring their account current by
paying the past due balance on their loan,
including late charges and other fees
assessed by the lender. 
• They may renegotiate the terms of their
loan with the lender. 
• They may pay off their loan by refinancing
the loan with another lender. 
• They may sell the property to pay off the
current loan (if the home is worth more
than the mortgage). 
• Or they may voluntarily convey the
property back to the lender through a
deed–in-lieu of foreclosure.
If the default is not cured by the end of the
reinstatement period, a lender typically will
proceed with foreclosure as permitted under
state law. Although the exact process may vary,
the lender generally sells the property through a
public auction or private sale and uses the
proceeds to cover the amount owed on the
mortgage. In most states, the lender also has
the right to pursue a borrower’s other financial
assets to mitigate any default-related losses. 
Sectio
n
4
.0
A
p
p
end
ices
DEFAULTING ON THE DREAM: STATES RESPOND TO AMERICA’S FORECLOSURE CRISIS44
Endnotes
1 Mark Zandi, Chief Economist and Co-Founder,
Moody’s Economy.com, 2008, “Monetary Policy
and the State of the Economy,” Testimony Before
the U.S. House Financial Services Committee
(February 26, 2008).
2 More details on their methodology can be found in
the appendix of the Losing Ground report at
<http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/foreclosu
re-paper-report-2-17.pdf>. 
3 Based on Center for Responsible Lending,
Subprime Spillover: Foreclosures Cost Neighbors
$202 Billion; 40.6 Million Homes Lose $5,000 on
Average, CRL Issue Brief, http://www.
responsiblelending.org/issues/mortgage/research/
subprime-spillover.html (accessed January 25,
2008). (Revised and updated February 28, 2008).
See Exhibit 1.
4 Mortgage Bankers Association, National
Delinquency Survey (March 2008). 
5 Ibid. 
6 Based on Center for Responsible Lending,
Subprime Spillover: Foreclosures Cost Neighbors
$202 Billion; 40.6 Million Homes Lose $5,000 on
Average, CRL Issue Brief,
http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/mortgag
e/research/subprime-spillover.html (accessed
January 25, 2008). (Revised and updated February
28, 2008). See Exhibit 1.
7 Global Insight, The Mortgage Crisis: Economic and
Fiscal Implications for Metro Area (Lexington, MA:
Global Insight, November 26, 2007).
8 Mortgage Bankers Association, National
Delinquency Survey (March 2008).
9 Center for Responsible Lending, Subprime
Spillover: Foreclosures Cost Neighbors $202
Billion; 40.6 Million Homes Lose $5,000 on
Average, CRL Issue Brief,
http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/mortgag
e/research/subprime-spillover.html (accessed
January 25, 2008). (Revised and updated February
28, 2008). See Exhibit 1.
10 Mortgage Bankers Association, National
Delinquency Survey (March 2008).
11 Craig Focardi, Servicing Default Management: An
Overview of the Process and Underlying
Technology, Research Note No. 033-13C
(TowerGroup, November 15, 2002).
12 If Ohio expands its commitment, as it is
considering doing, the total dollar amount of
publicly supported mortgage refinance funds could
exceed $800 million.
13 Mortgage Bankers Association, National
Delinquency Survey (March 2008).
14 RealtyTrac, 2007 U.S. Foreclosure Report (January
29, 2008),
http://www.realtytrac.com/ContentManagement/pr
essrelease.aspx?ChannelID=9&ItemID=3988&accnt
=64847 (accessed January 29, 2008).
15 Charles E. Schumer, Sheltering Neighborhoods
from the Subprime Foreclosure Storm (Special
Report by the Joint Economic Committee, 2007),
http://jec.senate.gov/Documents/Reports/subprime
11apr2007revised.pdf (accessed November 29,
2007). 
16 Ellen Schloemer, Wei Li, Keith Ernst, and Kathleen
Keest, Losing Ground: Foreclosures in the Subprime
Market and Their Cost to Homeowners (Center for
Responsible Lending, December 2006),
http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/mortgage
/research/page.jsp?itemID=31217189 (accessed
December 1, 2007).
WWW.PEWCENTERONTHESTATES.ORG 45
17 This pattern generally holds true with few
exceptions. First, states where foreclosures are
rooted in weakened job markets rather than in
subprime mortgages—such as Ohio, Michigan and
Indiana—have higher default rates than the
proportion of subprime loans in the market
suggests. Second, some states with high rates of
subprime lending, such as California, have lower
default rates than might be expected. Perhaps the
lower default rates can be explained by strong
housing market values that have resulted in high
levels of resale and refinancing. Also, as seen in
Exhibit 1, the delinquency rates for subprime loans
are many times larger than prime loans. Subprime
ARMs have even higher rates of delinquency.
18 Christopher L. Cagan, Mortgage Payment Reset:
The Issue and Impact (First American CoreLogic,
March 19, 2007),
http://www.loanperformance.com/infocenter/white
paper/FARES_resets_whitepaper_021406.pdf
(accessed December 1, 2007).
19 Ibid.
20 Craig Focardi, Servicing Default Management: An
Overview of the Process and Underlying
Technology, Research Note No. 033-13C
(TowerGroup, November 15, 2002).
21 Center for Responsible Lending, Subprime
Spillover: Foreclosures Cost Neighbors $202
Billion; 40.6 Million Homes Lose $5,000 on
Average, CRL Issue Brief,
http://www.responsiblelending.org/
issues/mortgage/research/subprime-spillover.html
(accessed January 25, 2008). (Revised data
updated February 28, 2008). See Exhibit 1.
22 William Apgar, Mark Duda, and Rochelle Nawrocki
Gorey, The Municipal Cost of Foreclosures: A
Chicago Case Study, Housing Finance Policy
Research Paper Number 2005-1 (Minneapolis, MN:
Homeownership Preservation Foundation, February
27, 2005).
23 Ibid.
24 Global Insight, The Mortgage Crisis: Economic and
Fiscal Implications for Metro Areas (Lexington, MA:
Global Insight, November 26, 2007).
25 David Evans, Public School Funds Hit by SIV Debts
Hidden in Investment Pools, Bloomberg News (Nov
15, 2007), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=20601170&refer=home&sid=aYE0
AghQ5IUA (accessed January 25, 2008). 
26 Global Insight, The Mortgage Crisis: Economic and
Fiscal Implications for Metro Area (Lexington, MA:
Global Insight, November 26, 2007).
27 William Apgar, Mark Duda, Bruce Gottschall,
Rochelle Nawrocki Gorey, and Angie Marks,
Preserving Homeownership: Community-
Development Implications of the New Mortgage
Market (Prepared by Neighborhood Housing
Services of Chicago, March 25, 2004),
http://www.nhschicago.org. See also Larry Cordell,
Innovative Servicing Technology: Smart Enough to
Sustain Homeownership Gains? (Research Institute
for Housing America, Conference on Housing
Opportunity: Will Technology Expand Housing
Opportunity, 2001). See also Amy Cutts and
Richard K. Green, Innovative Servicing Technology:
Smart Enough to Keep People in their Homes,
paper presented at Harvard University Joint Center
for Housing Studies Symposium: Building Assets
Building Communities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2003).
See also J. Michael Collins “Exploring the Design
of Financial Counseling for Mortgage Borrowers in
Default,” Journal of Family and Economic Issues
28(2):207-226.
28 J. Michael Collins “Exploring the Design of
Financial Counseling for Mortgage Borrowers in
Default,” Journal of Family and Economic Issues
28(2):207-226. See also Larry Cordell, Innovative
Servicing Technology: Smart Enough to Sustain
Homeownership Gains? (Research Institute for
Housing America, Conference on Housing
Opportunity: Will Technology Expand Housing
Opportunity, 2001).
29 Nevada proposed a hotline in 2007; the state is
considering the recommendation.
E
nd
notes
DEFAULTING ON THE DREAM: STATES RESPOND TO AMERICA’S FORECLOSURE CRISIS46
30 See note 12.
31 Previous studies suggested that counseling
programs had greater efficacy. However, today's
subprime loan terms and the decline of housing
values have made post-purchase counseling more
challenging.
32 Brothers Redevelopment, Inc., The Colorado
Foreclosure Prevention Hotline, 2007 Status
Report. Unpublished memo. (2007).
33 Ibid.
34 Ohio Foreclosure Prevention Task Force, Ohio
Foreclosure Prevention Task Force Combined List
of Recommendations (September 11, 2007),
www.bricker.com/legalservices/industry/bank/ftfrecc
.pdf (accessed December 1, 2007).
35 HOPE NOW Alliance, NOW: Support & Guidance
for Homeowners, Alliance Statement (October
2007), http://www.hopenow.com (accessed January
25, 2008).
36 State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group,
Analysis of Subprime Mortgage Servicing
Performance, Data Report No. 1 (February 2008),
http://www.csbs.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Ho
me/StateForeclosurePreventionWorkGroupDataRep
ort.pdf (accessed February 25, 2008).
37 Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency,
Pennsylvania Foreclosure Prevention Act 91 of
1983—Homeowners’ Emergency Mortgage
Assistance Program (HEMAP),
http://www.phfa.org/consumers/homeowners/hema
p.aspx (accessed December 1, 2007).
38 Ohio has two “funds” to assist delinquent
borrowers. The first is the “Ohio Rescue Fund” for
NeighborWorks organizations, which disburse
grants of up to $3,000 to help delinquent
borrowers catch up on their mortgages. The
second fund, the Opportunity Loan Refinance fund,
operated by the OFHA, has been less successful
due to strict underwriting requirements. The task
force advised OHFA to expand its guidelines.
39 Equity stripping, which is a predatory practice
employed by unscrupulous individuals, is designed
to identify vulnerable homeowners who have
substantial equity in their property with the goal of
“stripping” the equity in their property. These
equity strippers attempt to obtain title to the
property—at below market value, as part of the
terms to the transaction—and quickly attempt to
rid themselves of any interest the homeowner has
so the property can be sold and the equity
captured.
40 Paul Leonard, California Office Director, Center for
Responsible Lending, 2007, “Preserving the
American Dream: Legislative Recommendations to
Protect Future Borrowers in California,” Testimony
before the California Senate Banking Committee
(August 21, 2007); See also Mortgage Asset
Research Institute, Inc. 2006. Eighth Periodic
Mortgage Fraud Case Report to Mortgage Bankers
Association, <URL: http://www.mari-inc.com/
pdfs/mba/MBA8thCaseRpt.pdf (accessed April
2007); Global Structured Finance Outlook, 2007:
Economic and Sector-by Sector Analysis, Fitch
Ratings Credit Policy, (December 11, 2006), p. 21.
41 Robert B. Avery, Kenneth P. Brevoort, and Glenn B.
Canner, The 2006 HMDA Data. Federal Reserve
Bulletin (December 21, 7007), 23,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/defaul
t.htm (accessed Dec. 1, 2007). 
42 Debbie Gruenstein Bocian, Keith S. Ernst, and Wei
Li, Unfair Lending: The Effect of Race and Ethnicity
on the Price of Subprime Mortgages (Center for
Responsible Lending, May 31, 2006),
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rr011-
Unfair_Lending-0506.pdf (accessed Dec. 1, 2007).
43 J. Michael Collins, “Exploring the Design of
Financial Counseling for Mortgage Borrowers in
Default,” Journal of Family and Economic Issues
28(2):207-226.
44 State of New York Banking Department, “HALT –
Halt Abusive Lending Transactions & Mortgage
Fraud: About HALT,” Consumer Help and
Information, http://www.banking.state.ny.us/
cshaltnews.htm (accessed January 25, 2008).
WWW.PEWCENTERONTHESTATES.ORG 47
45 Colorado Department of Local Affairs: Division of
Housing, “Colorado Foreclosure Hotline: 1-877-
601-HOPE,” http://www.dola.state.co.us/
cdh/foreclosure.htm (accessed January 25, 2008).
46 Center for Responsible Lending, Subprime
Spillover: Foreclosures Cost Neighbors $202
Billion; 40.6 Million Homes Lose $5,000 on
Average, CRL Issue Brief,
http://www.responsiblelending.org/
issues/mortgage/research/subprime-spillover.html
(accessed January 25, 2008). (Revised and data
updated February 28, 2008). See Exhibit 1.
47 “New Law Gives Foreclosure Notice to Help
Renters,” Chicago Daily Southtown (August 31,
2007).
48 Edmund L. Andrews and Louis Uchitelle, “Rescues
for Homeowners in Debt Weighed,” New York
Times (February 22, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/business/22h
omes.html?pagewanted=1&ei=5070&en
=19b585b57f24e19f&ex=1204347600&emc=eta1.
For more information about FHASecure see
http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page?_pageid=33,717
446&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL.
See also Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Federal Housing Commission,
Mortgagee Letter 2007-11 (September 5, 2007),
available at
http://portal.hud.gov/fha/reference/ml2007/07-
11ml.doc
49 HOPE NOW Alliance, NOW: Support & Guidance
for Homeowners, Alliance Statement (October
2007), http://www.hopenow.com (accessed January
25, 2008).
50 ”More Than 200,000 Letters Sent to At-Risk
Homeowners: Alliance Urges Borrowers to Get
Help Now,” HOPE NOW Alliance press release
(October 31, 2007).
51 Jay Brinkman. An Examination of Mortgage
Foreclosures, Modifications, Repayment Plans and
Other Loss Mitigation Activities in the Third
Quarter of 2007. See also HOPE NOW: Number of
Homeowners Helped Rapidly Rising, press release
by Hope Now Alliance (January 18, 2008).
52 American Securitization Forum, Streamlined
Foreclosure and Loss Avoidance Framework for
Securitized Subprime Adjustable Rate Mortgage
Loans, Executive Summary (December 6, 2007), 33-
34, http://www.americansecuritization.com/
uploadedFiles/FinalASFStatementonStreamlined
ServicingProcedures.pdf (accessed December 1,
2007). 
53 IFLA was launched with a $15 million grant from
the investment management firm Paulson & Co.
Inc. IFLA provides funding and training to
organizations that help homeowners negotiate
alternatives to foreclosure. The majority of IFLA’s
funds will be given in the form of grants in 10 or
more states to support direct legal assistance to
borrowers, to fight foreclosure, predatory lending
and abusive loan practices. IFLA will do this
primarily by providing money to top nonprofit
legal-aid groups and law school clinics.
54 Mike Hudson and E. Scott Reckard, “More
Homeowners with Good Credit Getting Stuck in
Higher-Rate Loans,” Los Angeles Times, p. A-1
(October 24, 2005). For most types of subprime
loans, African-American and Latino borrowers are
more likely to be given a higher-cost loan even
after controlling for legitimate risk factors. See also
Debbie Gruenstein Bocian, Keith S. Ernst, and Wei
Li, Unfair Lending: The Effect of Race and Ethnicity
on the Price of Subprime Mortgages (Center for
Responsible Lending, May 31, 2006),
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rr011-
Unfair_Lending-0506.pdf (accessed Dec. 1, 2007).
See also Darryl E. Getter, “Consumer Credit Risk
and Pricing,” Journal of Consumer Affairs (June 22,
2006); Howard Lax, Michael Manti, Paul Raca, and
Peter Zorn, “Subprime Lending: An Investigation of
Economic Efficiency,” Housing Policy Debate
15(3):533-571.
E
nd
notes
DEFAULTING ON THE DREAM: STATES RESPOND TO AMERICA’S FORECLOSURE CRISIS48
55 Based on origination volume statistics published
regularly by Inside Mortgage Finance.
56 See e.g. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
National Credit Committee, Survey of Credit
Underwriting Practices 2005. By the industry’s own
admission, underwriting standards in the subprime
market have become extremely loose in recent
years, and analysts have cited this laxness as a key
driver in foreclosures. The Office of The
Comptroller of Currency (OCC) survey of credit
underwriting practices found a “clear trend toward
easing of underwriting standards as banks stretch
for volume and yield,” and the agency commented
that “ambitious growth goals in a highly
competitive market can create an environment that
fosters imprudent credit decisions. See also Fitch
Ratings, 2007 Global Structured Finance Outlook:
Economic and Sector-by-Sector Analysis
(December 11, 2006); See also Structured Finance:
U.S. Subprime RMBS in Structured Finance CDOs,
FITCH RATINGS CREDIT POLICY (New York, N.Y),
August 21, 2006, at 4 (noting that “loans
underwritten using less than full documentation
standards comprise more than 50 percent of the
subprime sector…” “Low doc” and “no doc” loans
originally were intended for use with the limited
category of borrowers who are self-employed or
whose incomes are otherwise legitimately not
reported on a W-2 tax form, but lenders have
increasingly used these loans to obscure violations
of sound underwriting practices); See also Vikas
Bajaj and Louise Story, Mortgage Crisis Spreads
Beyond Subprime Loans, New York Times
(February 12, 2008). See also Ruth Simon, Option
ARMs: Next Weakling. Fall in Home Prices, Rise in
Loan Values Force Foreclosures, Wall Street Journal
(December 22, 2007) (citing recent study from
Merril Lynch that states 'Merrill Lynch economists
called option ARMs "ticking time bombs" that will
start "ticking louder next year.")

